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OF all the arguments made by the Germans since the Lusitania was sunk, the strongest is that peaceful citizens should not act as insurance for vessels carrying contraband of war. The Germans may well argue that a motor-lorrie or a railroad train carrying ammunition is not the place for non-combatants; why then a ship which is engaged in carrying ammunition? The difference between the ship and the train is the difference made by international law. Non-combatants have a legal right to be protected on ships; they have no such right on railroad trains or motor-buses. And since they had the right, since our government maintained that they had the right, the passengers on the Lusitania were illegally done to death. Yet if it were possible to retrace American policy since the war zone proclamation, it would be difficult not to regret that some clearer understanding with Germany was not reached then. As a matter of humanity and common sense we could in February have agreed that American passengers should not sail on ships carrying absolute contraband. It would have been a concession of technical rights, but technicalities have been worth arguing for only because they were the last remnants of internationalism left standing in the wreckage of the war. They were worth arguing for, but not worth fighting for. This has been our attitude towards the British Orders in Council: that we intended to protest, but not to back our protest with force. And so in regard to Germany. We care about human safety at sea, about respect for non-combatant humanity, and not intrinsically about technical rights. But the Lusitania made an issue supremely more important than any legal discussion. It created a situation where any yielding of a technicality is an admission that "frightfulness" pays. We might agree with Germany that passengers should not travel on ammunition ships. We cannot agree with Germany that they shall be done to death. And if it should prove true that the Nebraskan was torpedoed, we should face the added difficulty that Germany had violated her own note of May eleventh and broken the truce which all decent negotiation requires. Here are the dilemmas that may be said to have crystallized in American opinion as it awaits the German reply to Mr. Wilson's note.

COLONEL Roosevelt's victory at Syracuse has all the elements of great significance, except the one which is perhaps most important of all. The case has not focussed political attention sufficiently to stir much thinking. Had the trial taken place a year ago, it might well have made enormous contributions to a better understanding of political morality. Around the emotions of the contest it would have been possible to define more accurately than ever before what a boss is, what corruption is, what are the relations of officials to their parties. The trial furnished an admirable classroom, and nothing was lacking for a great national object lesson except the interest of the pupils. The sinking of the Lusitania and Italy's declaration of war diverted that interest, and so they have in the largest sense destroyed the value of the case. But the verdict is nevertheless a triumph for Mr. Roosevelt and a smashing humiliation for Mr. Barnes. The

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Colonel was able to prove within the narrow limits of legalism an assertion which would have been humanly true even if the jury had gone against him. Printing contracts or no printing contracts, Mr. Barnes is typical of the profoundest corruption in our national life, because no democracy can endure if it is in the hands of men so cynically hostile to it. And though no one wishes to hound William Barnes or punish him unnecessarily, it must be clear to the leaders of the Republican party that his participation in the Constitutional Convention and in party affairs has now ceased to be decent or tolerable. He should retire, and try to be forgotten. And if in his solitude he wishes to find some comfort, let it be this: he was destroyed because he was the ablest, not because he was the worst of American bosses. The Republican party organization remains in the hands of men as reactionary as he, but not so clever and not so sensitive and not so courageous.

PRESIDENT Wilson is emphatically right in continuing to call the attention of the public to the handicap under which American commerce is suffering through lack of a sea-going merchant marine. In one way or another there should be owned in the United States a sufficient number of ships to carry at least a part of the foreign trade of the country. Owing to the very high freights now being paid, the number of vessels operated under the American flag has recently been increasing rapidly; but this condition is exceptional. Eventually the same old disagreeable dilemma which has availed to sweep American shipping off the high seas will return in full force to plague the country. Under the navigation laws American vessels cannot compete with those of other countries. The standards of living which those laws guarantee to American seamen cannot be impaired. If American vessels are to engage in foreign trade they will have to be operated at a commercial loss, and the only question is whether the government shall pay the loss as a subsidy to private owners or as a deficit in the operation of a government service. But if any question has been settled in this country it is that of ship subsidies; they could not be wrung from Congress even when the government was, in one way or another, subsidizing every other kind of economic activity. Assuming that we are going to have an American merchant marine, it must be owned and operated by the government. The administration's Shipping bill was defeated, but it will be easy to revive it under more favorable conditions at the next session of Congress. If as a result of the Pan-American Financial Convention the friendly interest and cooperation of the South American states can be secured, the establishment of a government line limited to carrying freight between the United States and the South American ports would stand a good chance.

WHETHER or not Italy had a sufficient legal pretext for breaking with her associates in the Triple Alliance has ceased to be a matter of much importance. She certainly had a plausible case, and under the rules of the game of European international politics no more was necessary. Italy's partnership with the central Powers was emphatically, almost exclusively, a matter of convenience. It was typical of those merely diplomatic marriages among nations which are contracted for ulterior purposes, and which are intended not to give legal form to common aspirations and mutual loyalties but to avoid the inconveniences of their absence. The Austrian Emperor's arraignment of Italian perfidy is not impressive. Both Austria-Hungary and Italy were playing their own hands without any very anxious solicitude for the interests of the rest of Europe. When, as the consequence of an aggressive act of the imperial Austrian government, the Triple Alliance ceased to make for European peace, Italy was released from her obligations and was justified, at least so far as her former partners were concerned, in pursuing an exclusively national policy. She was justified in using the situation created by the Austrian attack on Serbia for her own national benefit. By so doing she was merely paying any debt which she might owe to the central Powers in their own paper. Of course they prefer gold, but have they any right to ask for it? Nations which cannot be sure of converting their paper into gold should be careful not to issue too much paper. Italian participation in the war is plainly the legitimate outcome of the older predatory European system—the system which the Triple Alliance was intended to control, but which it succeeded only in perpetuating and intensifying.

THE important question is not whether Italy's participation in the war on the side of the Allies has any justification under the old rules, but what effect it will have upon the possible establishment of a new and better system. Such a system does not require that nations shall cease to be selfish, that they shall no longer pursue their special national interests, but it does absolutely require that they shall be disinterested, that they shall seek some fair adjustment between their own interests and the interests of their neighbors and political associates. Up to date Italy has given no proof of being disinterested. She may have been fully justified in rejecting the terms offered to her by her former allies, because of the lack of

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any certainty of their ultimate fulfillment, but she may also be seeking certain territorial advantages as the price of her participation which will gravely increase the difficulties of substituting a concert of Europe for the old competitive system. She is credited with seeking the exclusive political control of the Istrian and Dalmatian coast, which would result in shutting off the Germans and the Slavs from an outlet to the Adriatic—an outlet of which they cannot be deprived without the frustration of legitimate political and commercial ambitions. There is, to be sure, no proof that she has insisted upon such terms, and if she has insisted it is almost incredible that they should have been granted to her, but until the specifications of her agreement with the Allies are published these will all be under suspicion. Italy's accession destroys any hope of an inoffensive peace—a peace on the basis of comparatively slight territorial changes. It places on the Allies the terrible responsibility of satisfying the national ambitions which they have released for the purpose of defeating their enemies, without creating new antagonisms and grievances no less dangerous than the old. If they, too, have been issuing paper which they cannot be sure of redeeming in gold, they will be substituting one morally bankrupt political system for another.

A CONSTITUTION has been defined as a body of rules and maxims in accordance with which the powers of sovereignty are habitually exercised. It is supposed to define the relation of the various governmental organs to one another and to the state, and to determine those larger rights and powers and relations which are presumed to possess a certain permanency. But in actual practice our state constitutions have tended to lose this character of an organic and fundamental law and to approximate more nearly to the ordinary statute. To secure prohibition and then nail it down forever the easiest way is to pass a constitutional amendment. In our present Constitutional Convention in New York State all parties and groups, including even the leaders of labor, are seeking to write ordinary laws into the Constitution. Thus representatives of the State Federation of Labor ask that the Constitution compel the legislature to pass an old age pension bill, and provide for insurance against unemployment. They wish through constitutional amendment to make the state fund the sole agency for compensation insurance, and to keep the labor commission and the compensation commission separate departments of the government. But in trying to settle such details of legislation by means of a constitution, the unionists are guilty of exactly the practice of which employers have so often been guilty. Though in theory these labor leaders oppose legalism, they are in practice legalistic.

IN New York State it is a misdemeanor for any person to give information about methods of regulating conception. Sentiment has crystallized recently against this costly and dangerous remnant of barbarism, and a movement is on foot to amend the law so that duly licensed physicians may teach their patients the means of contraception. Such an amendment means merely that all physicians may do legally for all patients what most physicians now do illegally for the well-to-do. The first public meeting in favor of this change was held Wednesday evening. It was significant in every way—for the fact that some of the best known physicians in New York lent their names to it, for the quiet dignity of the immense crowd, and perhaps most of all for the considerate and intelligent reporting done in the newspapers. The New York *Times* began its account of the meeting with the following remarks:

> At the Academy of Medicine last night, with the support of physicians of standing and workers in sociological fields, the recently agitated movement to remove legal prohibitions against communicating methods of birth control and prevention received striking evidence of public support. The largest crowd that has gathered in the hall of that dignified and conservative institution in many months was on hand early. . . . .
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> Those who addressed the meeting were doctors, nurses and settlement workers. The terms used were as frank as those of the lecture room of the medical schools in spite of the fact that the men and women present in about equal proportions were not of the profession, and there was no evidence of any but a sincere and thoughtful attitude on the part of the hearers.

IT is a very pretty instrument of war that the Cleveland Automatic Machine Company describes in the advertising columns of the *American Machinist*. It is a high explosive shell. Inside it are two explosive acids. "Fragments become coated with these acids in exploding and wounds caused by them mean death in terrible agony within four hours if not attended to immediately." "From what we are able to learn of conditions in the trenches," it adds significantly, "it is not possible to get medical assistance to anyone in time to prevent fatal results. It is necessary to immediately cauterize the wound if in the body or head, or to amputate if in the limbs, as there seems to be no antidote that will counteract the poison." On reading this the first impulse is to denounce the diabolic Americans who could callously advocate this ammunition as "effective." The second impulse is to denounce the government which could permit such ammunition to leave the country. But on reflec-

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tion it becomes evident that no man in his senses could have written in such inhuman terms without anticipating just such reactions. What was the object of this infamous advertisement? Was it to sell a pedestal base machine, or was it to explode a poisonous shell of its own? The officers of this company are A. L. Garford, J. P. Brophy, George Cook Ford and Herbert Rich, all of Cleveland, Ohio. Was not Mr. Garford Progressive candidate for governor in 1912? How does he explain his advertisement? Does it speak for itself? Or does it speak for the majority stockholders, said to be "foreign capitalists"?

IN England until the end of April there were representative men and powerful organs of opinion ready and anxious to discuss a reasonable settlement, an honorable peace. Any group which, if opportunity offered, had declared against the crushing or humiliation of Germany would have been sure of a strong backing. Since the Lusitania was torpedoed, the English temper, judged by the English newspapers, has changed. The yellow press deliberately incited mobs to the violence which destroyed the property and threatened the lives of Germans in England. This violence, though not suggested beforehand by the more decent papers, is approved by some of them after the fact. The *Morning Post,* the ablest organ of Toryism, has an editorial containing these words: "We confess that we are not sufficiently democratic as a general rule to rejoice over precedents which are established by riot. But in the present case our regret about the method is tempered by satisfaction over the result. The mob was in substance right."

ON the *caveat emptor* principle, Sam S. and Lee Shubert, Inc., have a legitimate grievance against the theatrical critic of the New York *Times.* The *Times,* from the Shubert standpoint, is a beneficiary of the theatrical business. It gets part of its income from the Shuberts. What does it mean, then, by employing a man who helps damage Shubert expectancies? On the assumption that the public is docile and ignorant the Shuberts prepare certain goods for the market. They have a fair chance to dispose of these goods if the public's docility and ignorance are respected. But the *Times* critic does not respect them. He realizes that the producer has money at stake, but he fantastically insists that the public has money at stake as well. What the Shuberts cannot understand is the zeal of the *Times* in assuming inspectorship, especially when they profit by the business. Some day a light may dawn on the Shuberts. Meanwhile it is earnestly to be hoped that the *Times* will be maintained in legal victory.

Schism in the Liberal Party

THE German newspapers are unexpectedly shrewd in declining to read a specious and comforting lesson into the British Cabinet crisis. It does not mean any infirmity of British national purpose with respect to the war. The refusal to suppress domestic dissensions even in the midst of a dangerous public emergency is not, in the case of Great Britain, a sign of weakness. Englishmen are so accustomed to the indiscreet expression of their dissensions under any and all circumstances that weakness would ensue rather from the attempt at suppression than from their candid revelation. A nation like France, in which differences of political conviction have so frequently exploded in revolution, may not be able to indulge in cabinet crises during war without imperilling national unity; but in Great Britain the safety of the commonwealth does not demand any similar prudence. A wholesome, self-governing democracy lives by virtue of an unimpeded process of domestic readjustment, which, whenever it is delayed or forcibly suppressed merely accumulates and overflows into still more radical future changes. The coalition Cabinet implies a more rather than less vigorous and resolute prosecution of the war.

Although the significance of the Cabinet crisis is clearly domestic, its probable effect upon British internal politics is not nearly so clear; neither is it altogether promising. Novel and obscure conditions are at work. A coalition ministry during a grave national emergency is a normal expedient in France or Italy, countries governed by parliaments which are not dominated by two strong and responsible parties. The immensity of the public danger forces the several factions to sink their differences and assure to the government sufficiently loyal and firm support. But the British Government is supposed to have loyal and firm support without the use of any such expedient. In this country and in Great Britain the government has been controlled by one of two partisan organizations, both of which claim to be trustworthy agencies of national policy. They both claim to be fully competent to govern the country without the help of any other political groups. A party controlling a majority in the House of Commons which is obliged to seek the support of its opponents has confessed to weakness and inadequacy. It has ceased to be national.

The inability of the Liberal Party to continue the prosecution of the war without calling other parties to its assistance is certainly a confession of partisan weakness and probably a prophecy of disintegration. Liberalism, both as a party and as a creed, is becoming a house divided against itself.

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Englishmen of Liberal opinions have been united hitherto chiefly by certain common interests and opinions with respect to questions of domestic policy. They have been divided from their opponents the Conservatives chiefly by differences about domestic policy. The assumption has been that domestic political problems were of preponderant importance and were not necessarily entangled with questions of foreign policy. This assumption has been largely true for one hundred years, but it has recently ceased to be true. In so far as it has ceased to be true, the effectiveness of the Liberal party as an agency of government has been very much impaired.

After a long period of sterility in domestic legislation the Liberals assumed office in 1906 for the purpose of realizing a program of social and industrial reform. They had no special foreign policy of their own and no intention of repudiating that of their predecessors. The Liberal Cabinet modified its Conservative inheritance only in the interest of development. During the fierce party contests over the Lloyd George Budget and the Parliament Bill foreign affairs were even more than usually submerged, and were left chiefly in the hands of the Foreign Secretary. Sir Edward Grey was, indeed, severely criticized by a radical pacifist minority in his own party, which feared and disliked the consequences of too close an association with France and Russia; but the group was able and insistent rather than numerous. Its criticism did not make much impression upon official Liberalism or upon general public opinion.

This indifference and distraction were most unfortunate because the Cabinet and the party were confronted with the necessity of thinking clearly and of making one of the most critical decisions in British history. German aggression was steadily becoming an intolerable menace in the eyes of many Englishmen and of the rulers of France and Russia. It was forcing Great Britain by imperceptible degrees into closer relations with the Dual Alliance, but the extent of this relationship and its responsibilities remained none the less dangerously ambiguous. Great Britain acted as a friend of France, but continued to seek an understanding with Germany. Neither the German nor the French Foreign Offices knew how Great Britain would jump in the event of war between the two groups of powers. The reason they did not know was because the British Cabinet had not made up its own mind, and had not decided whether it would advise Parliament to go into such a fight or stay out of it. The Cabinet and the party were hopelessly divided on the question and did not dare to raise it. They lived on in the hope that events would never demand of them an answer.

When Germany did insist upon an answer, the Liberal party was saved from immediate schism by the violation of Belgium, but the schism could not be ultimately avoided. The party had been sufficiently united for the promotion of domestic social policies. It was not united as to the proper object and methods of British foreign policy, nor as to the desirable reaction of foreign policy upon the domestic program. Liberals might be able to sink their differences as long as the war lasted; but the discussion of terms of peace and of the military and foreign policy of the country upon the close of the war would have revealed irreconcilable differences of conviction. A coalition ministry composed of the centers of the old Liberal and the former Conservative parties would have followed hard upon the cessation of hostilities. Just why another kind of a coalition has become immediately necessary has not as yet been sufficiently explained, but whatever the novel complications of the crisis, it is indirectly the consequence of dissensions within the Liberal party. If that party had been united and strong it could have disposed of Winston Churchill without itself abandoning responsibility for the government of the country.

In all probability the successful prosecution of the war is now supposed to demand policies obnoxious to many Liberals. Conscription is likely to be necessary in case the war lasts through the summer of 1916, and the Liberals may prefer to share with the Conservatives the responsibility for proposing such an unpopular measure. Again, the Cabinet may have been obliged to secure the assistance of Italy by promises which involved Great Britain in onerous continental responsibilities, and pacifist Liberals might well prefer to disassociate themselves from such a policy. Finally, the opposition which the Lloyd George program of liquor regulation provoked among the Conservatives may have convinced the Cabinet of the impossibility of avoiding contentious legislation during war except by the continental expedient of a so-called national ministry.

In any event the schism runs deep, and it may be many years before the Liberals regain their cohesion. Questions of foreign policy will remain not only of critical importance, but they will become, far more than they have been in the past, the occasion of strenuous partisan controversy. The formation of a party which combines a moderate and considerate nationalism in foreign affairs with a sincere democratic radicalism on questions of domestic policy is improbable. Both the Liberal and Conservative parties may well disintegrate into groups, which will occupy a certain relation one to another on problems of external politics, and a different relation on problems of internal politics.

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A party which is capable of governing a country must be united both upon domestic and foreign policies, and so much of a union seems to be far from realization. The party system may not, indeed, recover its vitality until the formation of an Imperial Parliament necessitates a sharp separation between the foreign policy of the Empire and the domestic policies of its constituent self-governing democracies.

Economic Reserves in Peace

THE loans already issued on account of the European war considerably exceed ten billions of dollars, and this represents only a part of its tragic waste. A world deeply impoverished: such is the preliminary judgment of the economist. But there is a qualification to be made before we accept this judgment. Of the wealth destroyed in war, some part, large or small, would never have come into existence had there been no war. Every state, so even our most conservative writers affirm, has economic reserves not utilized in time of peace that may be drawn upon in time of war. Recall the prosperity of the industrial North in our own Civil War; the quick recovery of France from the disasters of 1870; the upward movement of Japanese industry and commerce during and after the costly war with Russia. We have seen statistics of Bulgarian production during the Balkan Wars that would almost justify the inference that a country prospers best when all its able-bodied men are fighting beyond the frontiers. Conclusions as to the present industrial state of the warring nations of Europe would be premature, yet all the evidence at hand conspires to prove that employment is more general, equipment more fully utilized, than in time of peace.

There are no satisfactory data for estimating the reserve economic powers of a nation. But in this country we regard the times as satisfactory when unemployment does not exceed ten per cent; and times are very good indeed when our industrial equipment is running up to ninety per cent of its capacity. Accordingly it is a moderate estimate that we hold ten per cent of our economic power in reserve—or, more properly speaking, permit this ten per cent to go to waste. Our annual production of wealth can hardly be less than twenty-five billions. Two and a half billions—an amount equal to the borrowings of Great Britain since the opening of the war—is, then, a conservative estimate of the reserves upon which we might draw if we were ourselves engaged in war.

All this is commonplace. What is remarkable is the confidence expressed by even the most orthodox writers on finance that in case of war we should find a way to tap this reserve, which we seem not able to do in time of peace. This existence of the reserve, it is generally agreed, is a matter of maladjustment. Demand can never be exactly determined, hence comes a natural hesitation on the part of supply to develop in full measure. There are delays in shipment of raw materials and finished products, delays in payment, and bad debts; and all these things produce sporadic shut-downs throughout the industrial system. The several classes of laborers and of material means of production are never at hand in ideal proportions; hence arises simultaneous scarcity and superfluity of productive elements. Such is our condition in time of peace. But in what respect does war improve it? Whatever uncertainty there was as to demand is increased by war. Transportation agencies are thrown into confusion, credit is impaired, and in the natural course of events enlistment is more likely to carry away the efficient workers, who are always scarce, than the inefficient, who are too numerous. Viewed mechanically, war ought to increase our economic reserve forces—waste forces—instead of drawing upon them for its sustenance.

Plainly, a mechanical view of the situation is misleading. What differentiates the war spirit from the spirit of peace is the substitution in war of national and social organic forces for the more or less mechanical private forces operative in peace. In war we are conscious of the solidarity of interests, and act cooperatively; in peace we allow our private interests a dominance that admits a vast deal of "lost motion." Under modern conditions of war the intervention of the government in industry is far-reaching, and such intervention is seconded by organized action on the part of great private interests.

Government intervention may take the form of offering a secure market for the products of industry. Almost anything may serve as a munition of war; besides, the industry of a state may be kept employed on supplies to be used in replacing the works, public or private, destroyed by war. Thus it is said that the French government is actively assembling structural and other material to repair the destruction wrought in northern France. Government intervention does not, however, confine itself to the creation of a market by orders on public account. Still more significant in the present European crisis is the support given by the governments, through national credit institutions, to enterprises supplying the ordinary markets, domestic and foreign. The British plan of guaranteeing credits through the Bank of England in order to enable the exporters and manufacturers to keep up "business as usual," is already

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familiar to all students of war finance. There appears to be good reason for believing that Germany has proceeded even more systematically to organize the national credit and place it at the disposal of industry. No producer, large or small, is permitted to cease operations for want of funds. To this fact we may ascribe the boldness with which German constructors proceed to lay down great commercial vessels that will be excluded from the seas for an indefinite period of time. We may be sure that the great private financial houses in all the countries at war are cooperating unreservedly with the government in providing credit for undertakings that would in time of peace be regarded as risky, and hence would languish for want of funds.

The war spirit creates no new resources. It organizes the financial power of a nation and directs it, not according to narrow principles of solvency alone, but according to broader principles that take into account also the national interest in a steadily functioning industry and a fully employed working population. The government and the financial institutions of national magnitude thus take upon themselves a part of the responsibility for directing the course of industry, and assume a part of the risks of loss. According to prevailing economic theory, the actual losses ought to be serious. The approved producer, sure that his bank loans will not be called in, will proceed with less than his usual caution. Some misdirection of economic resources would, indeed, seem inevitable under the conditions. And yet experience apparently proves that the results attained through introducing the spirit of organization into industry are salutary. If we relied in time of war upon the same forces that are operative in time of peace, we should expect far more disorder, far more unemployment, in war than in peace. We actually have less.

Two billions and a half represent our reserve economic forces, unutilized, wasting year by year. If we were at war we should find a way to put a great part of these resources to use. Why can we not find a way of doing this in time of peace? Are we so well supplied with all the necessities and comforts of life that this colossal waste is a matter of indifference to us? Consider the fact that we have millions of homes in which little children are growing up, underfed, improperly clad, to become a prey to disease and often, consequently, to vice and crime. Consider the fact that there is scarcely a great work of public utility in the whole country that is not handicapped or thwarted for want of funds. And yet we permit two billions and a half of economic resources to run to waste, even congratulating ourselves on the fact that we have them to draw upon in case of war.

The End of the Protocol

THE protocol in the cloak, suit, and skirt industry of New York City has come to an end through the action of the manufacturers. Under that protocol, which has been in operation in the industry during the last five years, sanitary conditions in the shops have been revolutionized, wages raised, labor conditions improved, and thousands of grievances amicably settled. The protocol brought manufacturer and workman together. It enabled each to understand to some extent the difficulties under which the other labored. It achieved much by mediation and compromise. It became one of the most significant and hopeful experiments in our whole industrial laboratory.

Legally the manufacturers had the right to end the protocol, inasmuch as it was not a time agreement but terminable at will. Their responsibility therefore is purely moral. When, however, the manufacturers seek to shift the blame for the rupture by asserting that the union had already broken the agreement, they are evading the real issue. Both the union and the Manufacturers' Association have at various times violated the agreement, and the protocol itself provides machinery for determining and correcting such violations. If the union was acting contrary to protocol law, the manufacturers had their remedy under the protocol. The Board of Arbitration, the highest court in the industry, was about to assemble. The manufacturers refused to meet the Board. They did not want their grievances settled. What they wanted was the destruction of the protocol.

We believe that this action of the manufacturers was ill-judged, for the protocol was as useful to them as to the wage-earners. The grievances now settled by the Association of the Manufacturers and the trade union must hereafter be settled in some way or other by the individual employer, who has more to lose and less capacity to negotiate. Even if no general strike occurs, a series of petty conflicts is likely to break out, with resulting insecurity and repression. The destruction of the union, if that occurs, would mean a return to a competitive exploitation of labor which would gravely handicap the best employers, strengthen more unscrupulous manufacturers, and sooner or later result in the break-up of the Manufacturers' Association. In their own interest the manufacturers who have just smashed the protocol will in the end be compelled to build up some substitute agreement.

In the meanwhile the industry may not be able to avoid a destructive and senseless strike. If such a strike takes place, either immediately or later,

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the issue is likely to be falsely stated and the public misled. It is an evil time for the sewing-trade unions, for the confessions of "Dopey Benny" reveal how in the past several agents of these organizations have availed themselves of the services of gangsters to beat up strikebreakers. That individual manufacturers have employed exactly the same class of men for equally brutal purposes is well known, but far more difficult to prove, since the manufacturers deal only with licensed detective bureaus, which in turn hire gangsters. Because of the public indignation, the union in case of a strike will be represented as a wholly lawless organization intent upon destroying industrial freedom and taking away from the employer the last vestige of his authority in the factory.

For the manufacturers have many fine phrases, which we may shortly see paraded in all solemnity in the newspapers. They claim "the right to discharge," "the right of administrative judgment," "the right to reorganize their shops." But all these phrases come down to a matter of dollars and cents and exploitation. The employers desire an unlimited and unquestioned right to discharge, not for principle's sake, but in order to pay lower wages. The workmen oppose this claim, not only to protect their union but because they want higher wages.

The difficulty is inherent in the industry as at present organized. Hundreds of shops make thousands of styles of garments. There is no one standard of wage payment for all these different styles, and each manufacturer is obliged to come to an agreement with his employees over the price which he is to pay for the making of each style. In these daily agreements his employees are represented by their committee, and the chairman of such a price committee, if he is an unreasonable man, can be exceedingly troublesome. But if the manufacturer is to have the right arbitrarily to discharge such union representatives, all collective bargaining will cease. The employer would only have to state the price (which means the wages) he is willing to pay, and if his terms were not accepted, he could throw the committeeman out of his job and oblige his employees to select a more amenable representative. Such a situation would be intolerable. Whether there is a strike or not, the employers and the employees in this industry must in their joint interest again come together to determine the principles by which wages are to be fixed in this highly competitive seasonal industry.

These principles, when they come to be fixed, cannot be far different from those laid down by the Board of Arbitration in its last session in January. Under that award, the employer enjoys the right to discharge, but such discharge is subject to review by a disinterested and impartial tribunal, and may be set aside if unfair, unreasonable or discriminatory. Administrative control within the factory is retained by the employer, but safeguards are given to the union to prevent such control being used to break down collective bargaining.

By what machinery these principles may be carried into effect in the present temper of the two parties cannot now be predicted. It would seem to us desirable to establish a trade agreement having a time element, in order to concentrate discontent at a given date instead of spreading it over the whole year. The right to strike a shop, like the right of arbitrary discharge, must during the term of the agreement be given up, and machinery should be provided, similar to that which existed last week, for the rapid and impartial consideration of grievances. It would be well if the role of lawyers under a new agreement were more limited than it was under the protocol, and if the proceedings could be rather in the spirit of mediation than in that of litigation. Finally, whatever the machinery adopted, some form of standardizing the prices of work should be carried through, in order to allow real collective bargaining for the whole industry, instead of splitting the problem of price-setting into a multitude of petty squabbles taking place daily in all the shops of the city. It was these squabbles which led to the discontent on both sides and to the breaking down of the protocol.

The protocol is at an end, and it is possible that it will never be re-established under that name. Some new agreement, however, is immediately necessary. Unless collective bargaining is resumed, the whole industry will degenerate, and the burden of the anarchical conditions which will result will not fall upon the workers alone.

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Italy Takes the Field

FOR every Italian the achievement of Napoleon in his famous campaign of 1797 must shine forth as a promise and as an example at the moment when Italy is about to undertake the problem which was set for Bonaparte more than a century ago. Not since the great war began has there been so complete a repetition of the circumstances of a Napoleonic campaign as in northern Italy at the present hour.

In the early weeks of 1797 Napoleon had finally disposed of the Austrian troops in the Valley of the Po. He had captured Mantua, occupied Verona, forced the line of the Mincio, won Arcola, and blocked a great Austrian army descending from the Tyrol in the glorious battle of Rivoli. He was now ready to assume the offensive and to carry the war into Austria, to the gates of Vienna.

His problem in the main recalls that of the Italian general staff to-day. The Austrian army lay in a broad circle from the Tyrol to the Adriatic, its lines resting on the Upper Adige, the Carnic and the Julian Alps; its advance guard held the east bank of Tagliamento, but a few miles from the present Austro-Italian frontier. The hostile circle Napoleon broke at three points. While he forced the Tagliamento, Joubert and Massena cleared the Tyro, moved down the valley of the Drave and joined their commander at Klagenfurt. Thus united, the army defeated the Austrians at Unzmarkt and Neumarkt, moved eastward to Leoben. The advance patrols had reached the summit of the Semmering and were looking down upon the hills about Vienna, when Austria gave up the fight and the Treaty of Campoformio ended the war.

Unhappily for the Italians, while in appearance the problem remains unchanged the conditions have been enormously transformed in the century that has passed. To-day the whole Tyrolese district has been fortified, that great peninsula of Austrian territory extending down into Italy; the frontier within twenty miles of Verona has become a sally port from which Austrian and German troops can burst into the Valley of the Po, protected on their flank and rear by the great fortifications which command the few roads through the Dolomites.

Before Italian troops can make any real advance toward Vienna, then, it will be necessary to break down this great circle of Austrian fortresses which hold the doorways to Italy, the gates through which have come all the Germanic invasions. In Napoleon's time this was a light task, for the defeat of the field armies decided the control of the roadways, after the fortresses in the Valley of the Po had fallen. But to-day, recalling what the French have accomplished in the Argonne, what the Austrians themselves have achieved in the Carpathians, it is hardly possible to exaggerate the difficulties confronting the Italians in mountains far surpassing the Carpathians and the Vosges.

Until the Tyrol redoubt is broken down, Italy cannot move. Look at the map and it will be seen that Austrian territory in the broad circle from the mouth of the Isonzo to the environs of Verona almost surrounds the northeastern province of Italy, which is the Venetia. Between Verona and the sea about Venice the distance is less than seventy miles. Could the Austrians, supported by the Germans, break out of the Tyrol along the valleys of the Brenta and the Adige, reach the Verona-Venice railroad, they would cut the line of communications of Italian troops to the north and east, isolate them, envelop them. While these Italian troops were striving to force an entrance into Austria from Pontobba to Gorizia, Austria, relying on her forts, could strike at their rear.

The real Italian front thus begins along the Verona-Venice railroad. But can the forts which command this line on the Italian side withstand the heavy artillery of the Germans? Would it not be possible for the Germans, recalling their victorious corps from the Carpathians, to launch one more offensive, this time at the Italians, to carry their drive south through Verona to the north bank of the Po and the east bank of the Mincio, take possession again of the famous old quadrilateral, Verona, Peschiera, Legnago and Mantua?

Could they do this the Austro-Germans would instantly shorten their own front. Instead of having to defend the whole circle from the Lago di Garda to the mouth of the Isonzo, their front would follow the Mincio and the Po to the sea, a line barely a fourth as long, resting upon the sea and the mountains and behind two considerable rivers. The military advantages of such an offensive thrust are then patent. The war would thenceforth for long months be fought on Italian soil, the situation in northern France would be repeated. Once the line were established, relatively few troops would be required to hold it.

Political effects, too, would flow from a successful German offensive. Defeat, disaster and invasion in the opening weeks would do much to shake the faith of the Italians in the ministry which, against the efforts of the most adroit of Italian statesmen, is now committed to war. The loss of Verona and Padua, the destruction of Venice, which

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would be an inevitable consequence of German success north of the Po, might produce internal disorders in Italy. But if it failed to do this it might still avail to hold back Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece. It might demonstrate anew and by the German method of "terribleness" how costly it is to make war upon Germany.

Between the Napoleonic parallel of 1797 and the German method well established in 1914, it seems wiser in the present circumstances to effect the latter. So far as it is possible to see, the Italian phase of the great war promises to open with a new German offensive. Because of the Tyrolese forts Italy cannot start for Vienna in the opening days. Weeks and months must pass before she can reduce this great redoubt, or drive her columns north to Botzen, thus blocking the great Adige funnel down which Germany can pour army corps from the Brenner. In these weeks and months it is wise to look for an effort on the part of Germany to carry the war into the Valley of the Po.

One other consideration must be weighed. From the Upper Engadine, across Swiss territory, there leads an admirable road from the head-waters of the Inn to the Valley of the Adda. By crossing Swiss territory here the Germans could reach the Italian Plain with a minimum of difficulty. A similar violation of Swiss territory to the west would open Splügen Pass from the Upper Rhine to the Val San Giacomo, leading down to Lake Como. These passes are eccentric to Swiss defence, could not be defended by the Swiss themselves, and offer an inviting avenue for the German necessity, which "knows no law."

Italy has, then, in addition to covering the frontier from the Adriatic to Lago di Garda, to watch for a possible German thrust through Swiss territory which would threaten Milan and imperil all of Lombardy. She can hardly risk an offensive toward Vienna by the Napoleonic route while this peril is still threatening her. It is wholly reasonable to conclude, on the face of the military situation, that Italy will put her masses on the frontier covering the Milan-Verona-Venice front, watching the passes from the Adda to the Brenta and pushing her advance north rather than east.

On the other hand, Italian reinforcements for the Dardanelles are practically certain to be sent. The operation is easy; Italy has sufficient troops to spare two or three corps, perhaps more. Her ambitions will drive her to do her part in the destruction of the Turk, that her claim upon his estate may be correspondingly great. The Italian fleet and the Italian army are, then, sure to be represented before the sea-gate to Constantinople.

It is wholly possible that the Italian army will be landed at Enos and sent directly against Adrianople. This would serve to draw off Turkish troops from the Gallipoli peninsula, it would threaten the Orient Railway, Turkey's last link with the outside world. Above all it would probably bring Bulgaria into the war on the Allied side, for Bulgaria could not endure seeing Adrianople pass from Turkish control to any hands but her own. The entrance of Bulgaria would carry the Turkish frontier back to the Chatalja, and Constantinople might fall before the forts of the Dardanelles.

It is, then, in the east that Italian entrance into the war is likely to have the greatest effect in the opening weeks. It should bring in all the Balkan states, if not at once, eventually. It does settle the fate of Turkey, it does insure the triumph of the Allies in the Mediterranean. It will ultimately tell heavily against Austria, but only when German help begins to fail the Hapsburgs. German victory in the Carpathians is the price of Italian delay. Italy must now face the armies she permitted time to destroy the Czar's corps on the Dunajec. She may have to face them on the Po, she must accept the fact that even temporary defeat at German hands will result for her in atrocities and destruction far beyond any that Belgium knew. All this must work for caution rather than Napoleonic methods at the outset.

FRANK H. SIMONDS.

The Inside of a Settlement

THE young Greek in immaculate black who guarded the portals welcomed us with a smile. The residents were at dinner. He hesitated a little. There was evidently some question in his mind as just what to do with us. A little more personal distinction on our part, one vaguely felt, would have won us an invitation to dinner. Could we at least see the house? It was a happy solution. He waved us towards the big reception room which opened before us. With one glimpse back at the new coffee room, flashing with tiles and brick and opulently beckoning the hungry wayfarer, we passed into the fine hall, with its rugs and pictures and shaded lamps and discreet magnificence. Visions of the little settlement we had imagined, plain, worn, serviceable, swam uncertainly before our eyes. We had come, as it were, to a shrine and found a temple.

Our seeing of the settlement, as we adventured from room to room, fumbling in the dark and flashing the electric light on spacious apartments, each more stately than the last, became a sort of Arabian Nights' adventure. The glamor of Piranesi etchings, carved fireplaces, the furniture and hangings, dazzled us. "Residents" became fan-

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tastically altered in my mind to "Residenz." We were Baedeker tourists in the palace of a little German prince—though what prince ever showed the impeccability of taste with which we found ourselves surrounded? A desire came over me for a little gallery where we might come out and look down upon the residents at dinner. What was a palace without a glimpse of the court? An anteroom with top hats and fur coats and canes suggested distinguished guests. Was there not indeed a little gallery? We wanted to ask our immaculate young Greek, but he would scarcely have understood. And indeed our suppressed ribaldry seemed singularly incorrect.

From the handsome rooms we stumbled up queer stairs to the dark and spacious neighborhood theatre, into kindergarten rooms, into tasteful classrooms decorated with photogravures of English cathedrals and renaissance masterpieces. Outside roared the redly-lighted city street, with its trolley cars and garish "movie" signs. Across the street in a bright cafe sat black-haired Greeks around their brandy and cards. The old brick houses seemed to bulge with swarthy humanity. Inside there seemed no limit to the resources. Suddenly we came upon a strange iron grating behind which little boys were gathering for an evening club. They had a curious silent look as of young domesticated human animals. As we groped through the halls the murmur of voices came to us and then died away. It seemed impossible that we should not at any moment open suddenly a door into a banquet hall blazing with candelabra. The few neighborhood people we met in the halls took on a queer feudal air, as of villagers on some sort of manorial service. Our last glimpse into this phantasmagoria as we rushed for our train, was of a little group of Polish women with shawls over their heads, sitting patiently within the reception room, staring into its soft light and richly furnished beauty, waiting for somebody to attend to them. The immaculate young Greek was still at his desk.

As we rode away I asked myself what devil of perversity could have given me this experience. To have passed thus through the settlement, seeing its treasures in all their nakedness, was to have committed a sort of spiritual grand larceny. It was like stealing from the residents, so innocently seated at dinner, all their spiritual values. It was to remain ignorant of what gracious light they might have thrown upon these lovely rooms by the mere being in them, ignorant of how they might have mellowed these trappings of comfort and culture so that they might be passed on significantly to the proletarian Greeks and Italians and Poles and Jews. It was too late, however, to be remorseful. We had caught the American settlement in its cultural nudity, and we could not help the philosophy that began to weave itself in our minds.

What stood out was the fact that the settlement had somehow got itself filled with things that didn't seem to bear remotely upon the cultural values of the varied people who came there so freely and welcomely. The people may have had the richest of cultural backgrounds, immemorial traditions, but these things were not of them. Were they even of the native culture of the residents themselves? These Piranesi etchings and carved desks and photogravures may have spoken of their innermost appreciations, but one could not feel it. The house seemed to speak too much of the things that are bought. There was the air of the opulent business man who had, with competent advice, ordered in the beauty in the midst of which he had to live. One had a vision of the kindly-disposed people of the city, out of their overflowing purses bestowing upon the settlement the pictures and rugs and chairs that they knew were "right." Everything seemed the most precious, brightest, most carefully minted cultural coin of the day. From my sternly sociological point of view it spoke chiefly of what a tasteful ruling class in an American city in the year 1915 considered beautiful and adequate. I had so clearly in my mind this restricted ruling class that I could not help seeing in these objects, representing foreign cultures, certain badges of caste. One wondered if the friends of the settlement had been too much for it, whether they had swamped the good will, social intelligence, exacting labor and Christian kindliness with which the work had been begun and carried on.

I knew that this was not at all the settlement's interpretation of itself. There was something innocent in this serene class-unconsciousness that the settlement revealed to our shameless gaze. Yet I asked myself what was the impression made upon the minds of those shawled Polish women, as they touched this harmony of material comfort? Would no thought be in their minds of the contrast between their own sour crowded rooms and the largeness and sweetness here? As I write, a haggard woman comes to my door for money. Just what does my "helping" do? Are people merely "folks" to be done good to? Should one take the settlement in the terms it takes itself, as a gracious neighborhood home filled with opportunities for work and refreshment and education to which the limited and deprived people about may come? Or are there wider, gloomier issues?

These are uneasy questions. I thought of another city which was giving to all its children through its public schools all the abundant opportunity of work and play and culture which the set-

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tlement offered to its neighborhood. But it was giving it without philanthropic taint, as a public service, so that each child, rich or poor, came and took his advantage as a public right from being a citizen of no mean city. The beautiful school buildings were not filled with symbols of an alien culture, nor did they bear the marks of caste. They had a native robust beauty, which children and teachers together put into it, and which would increase as their tastes and power of expression grew.

Here was a different philosophy of life. One wondered how many of the residents had an imaginative background such as the school I pictured. Always the harassing question remained, how resolutely the settlement was working, and how clear-sightedly, through the great city, to abolish the reasons for its own existence, how eagerly to make itself no longer serviceable.

Our Inconsistent Foreign Policy

THE sinking of the Lusitania brought to public attention with terrible directness the clash between our interests and those of Germany. Our existing disputes with England over our rights on the sea as a neutral nation reveal almost as insistently another clash of interests. In both cases the recognition of our rights compels us to demand from each nation renunciation of effective warfare against the other—in the one case, the destroying of commerce by submarines, in the other, restrictions upon neutral commerce.

The most significant fact in the present situation was the general failure of the American people to realize the imminence of the clash. We have other interests as vital and important upon which some sort of a clash is probable in the near future. The soberest and most conservative student will concede that because this great war disturbed existing relations, it will beyond a doubt alter existing interests; that when it is over, the readjustment to its results as well as the return to a peace footing will further alter the interests of nations and develop divergences where none before seemed credible. This has always been true during and after other great wars, and there is nothing to prove that this war will be an exception.

There is in this probable clash of interests nothing sufficiently dangerous to America's safety to cause great alarm, unless the American people are taken by surprise and led to believe it dangerous. A thorough study of the probable operation of forces by the relation of cause to effect, a knowledge of the normality of the forces which will be at work, and of the powerlessness of armament to obviate their operation, will allow preparation for all probable dangers and will prevent hasty action, which, if it avoided war, might cost us as much financial loss and physical suffering as an actual war.

Our present peril exists less in the aggression of other nations than in our own failure to have already decided the basic notions which of themselves determine expedient conduct. If the people are determined not to arm on any account, the authorities must be exceedingly careful not to raise diplomatic issues which will in the least degree provoke opposition abroad, and must relegate to the waste-basket a number of policies of previous administrations—among others the Monroe Doctrine. If, on the other hand, we decide to maintain certain interests and policies which can be made effective only by extensive armament, the people must reach that decision in advance or the government will be unable to execute the popular will when the time comes. It seems unwise to provoke a dispute and then to decline to fight about it, or to determine to fight and to find ourselves without the means.

The most perplexing factor of the situation exists in the contradictory precedents which descend to us from past history. First and foremost, we are a non-military people and as a nation are definitely pacific in disposition. Yet our most popular policy, the Monroe Doctrine, tacitly assumes our readiness to fight European nations who propose to extend their territory or influence in the Western hemisphere. This we cannot maintain if we do not mean to fight. It will be a peculiarly empty policy to enunciate if we declare that we do not propose to maintain it when it is challenged.

We cherish the tradition of non-interference in European politics, yet we hold at least three extra-continental possessions which are strategic spots of great interest to European nations—the Panama Canal, the Philippines, and Hawaii. The nineteenth century has extended the interests of European nations to the confines of the globe, and has made our isolation impossible. We cannot continue to act as if the great powers of Europe were not in existence so long as we hold places of as great importance to their interests as these. Our very possession is in itself a radical departure from the policy of isolation. The two are irreconcilable and we cannot follow them both, for the simple reason that we cannot walk both forward and backward at the same time.

Again, our protestations of brotherhood and amity for Latin-America and the various congresses

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and unions connected with Pan-Americanism radically conflict, to the thinking of South Americans at any rate, with our past conduct in the Mexican War, the formation of the Panama Republic, the Platt Amendment in Cuba, and our financial relations to San Domingo and Nicaragua. Yet both of these lines of precedent are generously represented in the diplomatic utterances of the past. We may follow either consistently and honestly; we cannot long continue to promulgate both.

We have enunciated a policy of free trade and the "Open Door" with Asiatic nations and have concluded treaties with them, placing them upon a par with the great European powers. We have also enacted exclusion laws to limit their immigration; at least one state has denied them the privilege of owning land—a privilege which the Japanese regard as essential. These policies, too, are irreconcilable.

Here is an astonishing array of contradictory ideas, all of which have behind them precedent and tradition, any of which will further somewhat the interests of the United States or its citizens, and for all of which plausible theoretical and high moral motives can be alleged. The one thing really imperative is a definite decision between these alternatives, and the greatest danger seems to lie in the apparent determination of the American people to support a highly inconsistent selection from them. We are apparently determined to remain a non-military nation, but to reassert the Monroe Doctrine without qualification, to retain our present extra-continental possessions, to form a Pan-American Union with Latin-America, and to deny the Japanese and Chinese the privileges in this country they both desire. This is an impossible policy because its parts are inconsistent. We cannot in actual fact challenge the influence or possessions of European nations in Latin-America unless we are willing to use force in case they should decline to yield to our demands. We shall retain our extra-continental possessions, unless we are able to defend them in fact, only so long as other nations do not desire to seize them. We cannot effectively threaten others with our displeasure so long as the known condition of our armament makes impossible the execution of our threat. Something must be sacrificed, and the American people must decide what it is to be.

If the people vote decisively against armament, that will probably decide the whole situation, and the government will then be able to enunciate clearly non-interference in Europe or elsewhere, prosecute plans for a Pan-American Union, and nurse the policy of the "Open Door" in the Far East. This will be consistent and clear. If, on the other hand, the people decide that the Monroe Doctrine must be maintained and will agree upon a definition of what it means, if they are unwilling to surrender the Panama Canal or Hawaii to any other nation, the government will know that this means a readiness to fight and it will arm accordingly.

Armament and disarmament are means and not ends, and cannot be divorced from policies and interests. The American people must define as soon as possible the objective of American policy. The real truth seems to be that there is a variety of alternatives, none of which is wholly good or wholly bad, wholly against our interests or wholly in favor of them, entirely without precedent or sustained by a consistent reading of precedent. Unfortunately, there seems to be nothing from which it cannot be plausibly argued that we have something to gain, and nothing from which it cannot be reasonably alleged that we have something to lose. The most essential thing is that the American people should advisedly make up their minds as to which they prefer to lose. The greatest menace to our safety at present is their apparent disinclination or inability to reach a decision, for it prevents the government from preparing effectively for an emergency of any kind.

ROLAND G. USHER

Canada's Part in Empire

THE prominence of Canadians in the European War has puzzled many people in this country who recall that as recently as 1913, Canada refused to contribute three dreadnoughts to the British Imperial Navy. The incident thus recalled was pardonably misunderstood at the time, not only in the United States but in Germany, but as a matter of fact it is peculiarly available just now for representing the distinctive quality of Canadian loyalty to the British Empire.

In the first place it must be pointed out that the Canadian House of Commons passed the Naval Aid bill providing for the expenditure of $35,000,000 on three dreadnoughts for the Imperial Navy, but that the Canadian Senate rejected it. The Canadian House of Commons is elected by the people. The Canadian Senate consists of men appointed for life as a reward for party loyalty and activity. The Borden Conservative government, it may be remembered, was returned to power in 1911, and the Conservative House of Commons passed the dreadnought bill by a vote of 101 to 68, a very large majority as parliamentary majorities go in Canada. The Liberals, however, were in the majority in the Senate, and the Senate killed the bill at the bidding of Sir Wilfred Laurier. His object was to force a general election before the

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Borden government had had further time to strengthen itself in the country.

Mr. Borden, however, did not resign, nor did he make any attempt to reintroduce his bill in the Commons; he decided to wait until time and his own appointive power should give him a majority in the Senate.

But while it is true that the House of Commons passed the bill, it is also true that the parliamentary opposition to it was the fiercest developed in the country's history. Parliamentary opposition is emphasized, for of the bitter conflict on the floor of the House there was but little reproduction throughout the country. The Liberals, as the jealous guardians of autonomy, showed from the first that they had fundamental objections to the bill, but the bitterness of the debate did not arise from these so much as from the crude methods by which the government sought to pass it. Mr. Borden, himself a singularly inoffensive leader, was surrounded by a Cabinet which consisted, with one exception, of men quite devoid of ministerial experience, parish politicians *in excelsis*. Their arrogance and want of tact precipitated a notorious scene on which ensued a fortnight's continuous sitting that was brought to an end through the adoption of new rules of debate. It was this application of the so-called "gag" (a sane measure insanely adopted) which they believed would prove very unpopular throughout the country, that encouraged the Liberal leaders to kill the bill in the Senate.

Impartial observers were convinced then that the Naval Aid bill would have passed the Commons decorously in due course had it been in the hands of a more experienced government. If it had so passed, the Senate would never have rejected it; for the value of what is known as a "flag-waving campaign" is well known in Canada. Such a campaign was largely responsible for the defeat of American reciprocity in 1911; such a campaign would have overwhelmed the Liberals in 1913.

This was the parliamentary history of the Naval Aid bill, from which it may be seen that not the Canadian people but an aggregation of protected politicians killed it. The rejection in itself tells us nothing about Canadian loyalty, but the character of the debates on the bill tells us much. When Mr. Borden introduced the bill, he dwelt on the supreme problem which faces the British Empire, that of combining the most effective cooperation between the overseas dominion and the mother country with the largest possible measure of local autonomy, so as to secure their common heritage. "When Great Britain," he said on December 5, 1912, " no longer assumes sole responsibility for defence upon the high seas, she can no longer undertake to assume sole responsibility for, and sole control of, foreign policy, which is closely, vitally and constantly associated with that defence in which the dominions participate. It has been declared in the past, and even during recent years, that responsibility for foreign policy would not be shared by Great Britain with the dominions. In my humble opinion adherence to such a position would have but one and that a most disastrous result."

Such was the ideal of the dominant party in Canadian politics in 1913. It is the same to-day, and it is more than likely to continue the same for all but an insignificant minority of the Canadian people after a war in which Canada shall have given her men and material resources in the defence of the Empire. Unless the horror of the war should so influence the Canadian people that they will refuse ever again to break bread with the ancient stock, Canada will demand an active, effective part in the control of Imperial affairs. What exact scheme of Imperial federation or quasi-federation can be formulated is a most intricate problem, but even the most aggressive stickers for a doctrinaire autonomism will probably be forced to realize that, as Lord Morley once wrote, "politics is the science of the second best."

Canadian loyalty is thus not only a memory but an aspiration. It is not only grateful for the protection which the Empire has afforded it, but it believes that it has great allies—time and unlimited natural resources which will eventually help it to become the dominant partner in the Empire. If the part which the blood-tie plays in Canadian loyalty is not emphasized here, it is because affection is less characteristic of that commodity than pride. To the thinking Canadian the twentieth century is Canada's century, and the British Empire is Canada's opportunity.

When Sir Wilfrid Laurier opposed the Naval Aid bill, he did not do so because he wanted to shirk the responsibilities of Empire, above all the debt which Canada owed the mother country. "If there were an emergency" he declared in 1912, opposing the granting of the dreadnoughts, "if England were in danger—no, I will not use that expression; I will not say if England were in danger, but simply if England were on trial with one or two or more of the great powers of Europe, my right honorable friend might come and ask not thirty-five millions, but twice, three, four times thirty-five millions. We would put at the disposal of England all the resources of Canada, there would not be a single dissentient voice." But Sir Wilfrid, proud of himself as an "old-fashioned Liberal of the school of Fox," believed that the Naval Aid bill was a menace to autonomy, and he opposed it accordingly. He went so far as to declare that "when

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England is at war, we are at war: but it does not follow that because we are at war, we are actually in the conflict." This great French-Canadian was asserting the right that no Canadian ship should move in hostile conflict until it was authorized by the Canadian Parliament which commissioned it. It is a question whether the hair was worth splitting by a Liberal leader who, doctrinaire in theory and opportunist in action, had himself induced Parliament to send troops to the Boer War; but Laurier was determined that Canadian control over Canadian ships should be unquestioned and unquestionable. He denied the existence of the military emergency which the Borden bill was designed to meet, but he proposed an even more elaborate expenditure on two fleet units to patrol the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, equipped, maintained and manned by Canada, to be the foundation of a real Canadian Navy. He pleaded that the proper conception of Imperial duty was that the young nations of the Empire should replace in their own seas whatever ships the mother country was compelled by the German menace to remove to the North Sea.

How the war will affect Canada's imperial destiny is still a matter for speculation, but to-day there are no complications.

The German-Canadians are in bitter case, but their attitude is unquestionable. "We are at war with the system of Germany, not with the German race," says Professor F. V. Reithdorf of Woodstock College, a native German and a former German soldier. "If need be, I should even fight against Germany, though with a bleeding heart." Even Mr. Bonoassa and the Nationalist party, a mere handful, are disgruntled mainly because Canada has no direct voice in Britain's foreign policy. French-Canadians and Irish-Canadians alike are going to make up the one hundred and fifty thousand men whom, before long, Canada will have placed under arms for the cause of the Allies. They are not men who love war, but, for the most part, industrious men who love peace, and they have not fostered in Canada any of those national animosities which they or their fathers cherished in Europe.

When Canada emerges from the war the question of federated freedom or separated freedom will remain. The country cannot be content to remain as she is. From the rudimentary self-government up to 1837 she has progressed steadily, obtaining by degrees the responsibility of her executive to the people, the absolute control of parliament over revenue, the control of public lands, of fiscal policy, and the right to make her own commercial treaties. Such a development must go on. But in the meantime Canada has no doubts. Whatever the feasibility or infeasibility of federation, she is to-day unquestionably loyal to the Empire.

MAURICE JOY.

Germany's Food Problem

THERE recently appeared in Germany a pamphlet entitled "Our Eighth Enemy." This enemy was not Italy, who then wavered on the brink of hostility, not Rumania who threatened to join Italy in her attack, not Greece nor Holland nor Denmark, but an enemy within the frontier, who laid waste his native country by eating up her scanty stores of food. Germany's eighth enemy was the pig.

During my stay in Berlin a few weeks ago every conversation, however, it began, always seemed to end with a discussion of the pig. There were some who believed that the pig could be killed off gently and slowly—a million or two a month. Others, better informed, were convinced that their country's fate was sealed unless at least eight or nine million pigs were sacrificed instantly. All agreed that the pig in his present excessive numbers was a menace to the German cause; that in the consumption of food he was the chief competitor of man; that unless the pig population was reduced, the terrible prophecy of Charles Richet would be literally fulfilled. "Before nine months are out," the great French physiologist had written, "Germany will be on her knees suing for peace, unless indeed already speechless with hunger."

That Germany is not already "speechless with hunger" is due to the skill with which, since the war began, she has addressed herself to this problem of her food supply. Few had anticipated that commerce could be shut off so absolutely. Even if the country were blockaded, it was thought possible to import food through Holland, Scandinavia or Italy. Actually, however, Germany, which yesterday was a part of a vast world market, has become a closed economic area, reduced to the expedient of providing for herself. Her food production is normally less than her food consumption. If she is not to starve, her production and consumption must be brought into harmony.

With this object in view, a group of experts came together in the fall of 1914 to investigate the food situation. The resulting volume of nearly two hundred pages, although already out of date and

NORTHAMPTON MASSACHUSETTS

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requiring revision, is one of the ablest statistical studies ever made: *Die Deutsche Volksernährung und der Englische Aushungerungsplan. Eine Denkschrift von Friedrich Aereoboe, Karl Ballod, Franz Beyschlag, Wilhelm Caspari, Paul Eltsbach, Hedwig Heyl, Paul Krusch, Robert Kuczynski, Kurt Lehmann, Otto Lemmermann, Karl Oppenheimer, Max Rubner, Kurt von Rumker, Bruno Tacke, Hermann Warmbold, und Nathan Zuntz. Herausgegeben von Paul Eltzbacher.* (*Friedr. Vieweg und Sohn. Braunschweig, 1914.*) The problem was to make up the food deficit. German cattle and swine had been consuming enormous quantities of imported fodder, and hundreds of millions of dollars had been yearly spent on foreign wheat, barley, lard, butter and eggs. It was known that the import of ten million tons of fodder would cease. It was also anticipated that the home production of food would be lessened. Fishing in the North Sea would be impossible, and agriculture would suffer from a dearth of skilled men and of horses drafted into the army, as well as from a reduction in the available manure. With less food produced and less food imported, the problem of adjusting demand to supply would become difficult.

We need not go into the intricate calculations by which this group of physiologists, agronomists and statisticians determined the food needs of the German population. How many calories are required to supply some sixty-eight million Germans of both sexes and all ages, some doing no work and some working as navvies, with sufficient energy to keep them going for 365 days? To the lay mind, the answer 56,750,000,000,000 of calories may not be informing. The essential point, however, was that the Germans, like all civilized peoples, were found to be already eating—and wasting—food far in excess of their physiological requirements. There were certain ways of increasing the food supply, but the chief means recommended by the commission for bringing about a balance between supply and demand was to conserve the supply and to prevent waste.

Since this commission reported, much progress has been made along these lines. But for the measures taken by the government to conserve grain, this most necessary of foods would long since have been exhausted. Formerly cattle and pigs devoured some seventy million bushels of rye, as well as other cereals, but such feeding of grain to live stock has been forbidden. The distribution of bread to the people is regulated by a system of bread cards, which provides for a daily ration of about nine ounces (250 grammes). I was told that this amount sufficed for people who had alternative foods, and in my own hotel I discovered that most of the guests consumed far less than their allotted amount. But for the poor, and especially for men engaged in hard manual labor, the present ration is insufficient. The regulation of the bread supply came in fact so late that much deprivation was inevitable. Since the Germans are a loyal and a docile people, however, they are willing to live on little if they can but defeat the "English plan" to starve them out. They therefore eat their nine ounces of bread contentedly, and eke out this ration with potatoes.

And here we return to *nos cochons*, for it is the pigs who eat up the potatoes. In 1913 Germany produced no less than fifty-four million tons of potatoes, or almost five pounds per person per day. But many potatoes rot, and large quantities are used in the manufacture of alcohol and starch, while many millions of tons are fed to pigs. It is of course better to feed potatoes than grain to pigs, but even potatoes are needed to-day, and it is manifestly unwise to maintain an excessive porcine population at the expense of human beings. The whole procedure is absurd. Potatoes, rising in price, are fed to swine, which also rise in price, and the dearer the pig products become the higher goes the price of potatoes. It is a vicious circle, from which no one profits but the pig and the peasant.

There is no way of satisfying a pig, but a pig's owner may be satisfied. The specialists have therefore evolved a plan which may soon be carried into execution, by which all the parties in interest can be compensated. This plan provides that potatoes necessary for the people until the next harvest shall be requisitioned and bought at current prices by the government to be distributed at the proper time at cost or less. This reduction in the amount of food available for pigs will automatically limit their numbers. It is essential, however, that the right number of pigs be sufficiently fattened, instead of an excessive number being kept in a half-starved condition. Accordingly the plan provides that a maximum price be established for pig-products; that the government buy at this maximum price a quantity of pigs, determined in advance by the experts, preserve and store the meat, and at the proper time distribute it at half price or less. The farmers will thus have their profits; the people, their potatoes and cheap pork; and the government may write down the expenditure of a few hundred million dollars to one of the most necessary of all war expenses, the maintenance of the welfare of the civil population.

Though this suggested solution of the pig problem seems simple, it involves sharp conflicts of group interests. The peasant needs his pig to fertilize his land, and he does not readily see why he cannot use his own potatoes, or for that matter his own grain, to feed his own hogs. The Imperial

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Council is therefore obliged to appeal to his patriotism, to represent any such limitation of his peasant's liberty of action as "a matter of honor in the interest of the defense of his country." Nor is the great land owner always more amenable. Though willing to sacrifice his sons or himself in battle, he obstinately demands his right to save the lives of his pigs, now that pig-raising has become profitable. It requires authority and above all tact to carry out any such plan. In a semi-democratic country like Germany, even in wartime—perhaps especially in wartime—little can be done without the good will and the cheerful acquiescence of the people.

It is that good will which the German governments are now seeking to secure in solving the food problem. The Prussian Minister for the Interior issues books and pamphlets addressed to housewives, telling them in homely phrase how to save food as they have hitherto saved money. The German, so the housewife is told, eats two-fifths more than is necessary. One may want to eat and yet not really be hungry. Germany, she must remember, has not too much of any food except sugar. Potatoes should be cooked in their skins; to cook meat with potatoes and vegetables, though it requires more time and care, is more economical. A mass of such literature, a flood of "Open Letters to German Women," of "Hints on War Economies," of "War Cook Books," point the same lesson. Women are instructed how to cook most economically, and school children, especially girls, are taught to save food. Against the excessive eating of cakes Germany carries on a campaign like that which Great Britain directs against drunkenness. It is a struggle of a united nation drawing upon all its resources of patriotism.

How this food-saving campaign of which the slaughter of the pigs is but one incident will work out no outsider can surely tell. But daily it seems more probable that while Germany will suffer hardships during these months before the harvest, she will none the less come safely through. Next year, if there is another year of war, she will have to depend upon still smaller harvests, for her labor supply will be less and her supply of fertilizers will be much less. She will, however, have handled the problem earlier, will have conserved her food better, and will, in the opinion of experts, again come through. What she has to fight against as a result of her reduced food supply is less starvation than discouragement and war weariness. She is obliged to struggle against narrowing resources, a tradition of waste, and the paralysis which comes from one of the most effective blockades in the world's history. But she has on her side science, system, and unexampled loyalty.

W. E. W.

Genteel American Poetry

POETRY in America before the Civil War was an honest and adequate phenomenon. It spoke without affectation in a language and style which it could take for granted. It was candid in its tastes, even in that frank and gentle romanticism which attached it to Evangelines and Maud Mullers. It modulated in obvious ways the honorable conventions of the society in which it arose. It was a simple, sweet, humane, Protestant literature, grandmotherly in that sedate spectacled wonder with which it gazed at this terrible world and said how beautiful and how interesting it all was.

The accent of these poets was necessarily provincial, their outlook and reflectiveness were universal enough. Their poetry was indeed without sensuous beauty, splendor, passion, or volume, but so was the life it expressed. To be a really great poet an American at that time would have had to be a rebel.

It would have been an interesting thing if a thunderclap had suddenly broken that cloudless new-world haying-weather, and if a cry of exasperation had escaped some strong soul, surfeited by the emptiness and blandness of that prim little moral circle that thought it had overcome everything when in fact it had touched nothing. But to the genteel mind of America, before Walt Whitman and the Civil War, there was no self-respecting opposition. Of course, in that boundless field of convention, prosperity and mediocrity, a wild poppy might struggle up weedily here and there amid the serried corn. But the irregular genius had no chance. He felt sincerely ashamed of himself. He hid his independence, fled to the back woods or to Europe, and his sad case was hushed up as if it had been insanity (for insanity was hushed up too) and buried with a whisper under the vaguely terrible epitaph DISSIPATED. He probably died young; at any rate he never "did" anything. Whoever was unharnessed was lost.

In England at about the same time or earlier there was a marked division between the poets who were national, conventional and edifying and those who were disaffected. Wordsworth and Tennyson were more than matched by Byron, Shelley, and Swinburne. What occasioned this division in England was the very distinct and intolerant character of the national mind. You either identified yourself with it and expressed it sympathetically, or you broke away from it altogether, denounced it as narrow, stupid, and oppressive, and removed yourself offendedly to Greece or to Italy, to sing of lovely sensuality or celestial justice. A circumstance that made such romantic truancy all the easier for poets was the classical cast of their edu-

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cation. History, religion, and literary tradition, united with the ease of travel, carried the mind of every educated man continually beyond the limits of his country and its present ways. When one's moral possessions are so largely of foreign extraction, it requires no break with one's education, but merely a certain deepening and arrest in it, for things not national to seem the right environment for the soul. Exile accordingly did not sterilize the British poets: on the contrary, it seemed to liberate their genius and carry them back, across the Reformation, to an England as poetical if not so vigorous as that of Shakespeare.

Why did no disaffected Americans figure among these poets of the foreign, or rather of the human, ideal? The provocation to secede was certainly not less than in England; for if the country was not dominated by any church or aristocracy, it was dominated no less rigidly by democracy and commercialism. The land was indeed broader, and those who felt spiritually restive could without any great scandal make for the wild West. That was certainly a resource for adventurous temperaments; but those whose impatience was moral, whose need was not so much for room as for something to fill it, could hardly be satisfied there; for morally all America even to-day is far more monotonous and uniform than England ever was. It was perhaps this very pressure of sameness which might have justified a poetic protest, that prevented it from arising.

The insurrection that actually took place was that of Walt Whitman, with the magnificent intention of being wholly direct, utterly sincere, and bothering about nothing that was not an experience of the soul and of the sense here in the motley foreground of life. It is notable that this powerful insurrection in favor of what is modern and national has made so little difference. Of course, nothing can compel people to read or to like an author that displeases them. Perhaps Walt Whitman made the mistake of supposing that what was vital in America was only what was absolutely modern and native, to the exclusion of anything that might have been transplanted to this country ready-made, like the Christian religion or the English language. He wished to be wholly impressionistic, wholly personal, wholly American, and the result was perhaps that he was simply mystical, missing the articulation of the great world, as well as the constructive mind of his own age and country. After all, the future often belongs to what has a past. Walt Whitman renounced old forms without achieving a new one, and in his thought also there was more detritus than invention.

At any rate, the genteel manner having become obsolete, and the manner of the great mystical tramp not having taken root, the poetic mind of America suffered a certain dispersion. It was solicited in turn by the seductive aesthetic school, by the influence of Browning, with his historico-dramatic obsessions, by symbolism, by the desperate determination to be expressive even with nothing to express, and by the resolve to write poetry which is not verse, so as to be sure of not writing verse which is not poetry. The spontaneous me has certainly been beaten in the first round by the artistic ego. Meantime the average human genteel person, with a heart, a morality, and a religion, who is after all in the majority, is left for the moment without any poetry to give him pleasure or to do him honor. GEORGE SANTAYANA.

A COMMUNICATION

Criticism from Mr. Amos Pinchot

SIR: In view of certain criticisms I have made about THE NEW REPUBLIC, one of the editors kindly asked me to write a communication expressing my views. That THE NEW REPUBLIC is willing to publish it, in spite of its length and its frankly critical tone, is evidence of its willingness to be disagreed with.

The feeling THE NEW REPUBLIC gives me is that its owners and editors are having a little camping trip along the pleasant foothills of progressive reform. What the result of this outing will be nobody knows. Whether THE NEW REPUBLIC will fall in love with the scenery and settle, or proceed onward toward the big country, or hit the back trail for home, it is too early to tell. However, we believe that these "mighty, young bronze beasts," as Max Eastman calls its editors, will not rough-hew their ends beyond the power of destiny to shape them in an agreeable and polite manner.

There are some things that puzzle people about THE NEW REPUBLIC. Chief among them is the question, on what side does it stand in the general line-up? I understand that the editors themselves disclaim advocacy of either side. They resent being classified as having any particular purpose, and prefer to represent unfettered, naked truth, bathing itself, in an aloof and leisurely manner, in the cool waters of the Pierian spring.

THE NEW REPUBLIC is a beautifully made up magazine. Well printed, neatly bound and with an appearance of quiet but by no means rigid dignity, its appeal is frankly to people of the better sort. Moreover, it is well written, undoubtedly as well written as any magazine can be whose editors are so constantly thinking about writing well.

Yet while this high literary standard is scrupulously maintained, THE NEW REPUBLIC is by no means austere. It realizes that humor—good, sound, post-Victorian, college-

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bred wit—is not out of place, even in a magazine dedicated to the dissemination of mature unemotional opinion. Summing up the achievement of the editors, they have managed to found a paper that takes its place on the table of intelligent households where there is a desire for progress, and yet a wholesome fear lest progress be realized too fast.

But still, the progressive tendencies of THE NEW REPUBLIC are undoubtedly a source of alarm to many who see in them an incitement to social unrest. For, though THE NEW REPUBLIC does not take sides on the fundamental issues in the larger struggle between privilege and democracy, it does stand for reforms which are incidentally connected, in a more or less fringe-like relation, with the real conflict.

THE NEW REPUBLIC campaigns fearlessly for an eight-hour day, and for collective bargaining—in a rather on-the-one-hand way, it is true, but it stands for it. It opposes child labor. It upholds morality in business, politics, and everywhere else. It pleads for progress. It even goes so far as to rebuke some of our most distinguished defenders of privilege, such as Mr. Root or Judge Gary, when they utter sentiments of more than ordinarily remote antiquity.

THE NEW REPUBLIC is surely a forward-looking sheet. But in order to quiet all fear on the part of its readers lest it be over-radical, let us remind them that to attack the ragged edges of a thing, whether it is economic privilege or slavery, is not necessarily to attack the thing itself.

For example, if in the early '50's a movement had been started to preserve the institution of chattel slavery, the most effective way to have gone about it would have been to start a campaign with the purpose of attacking some of the most flagrant abuses of chattel slavery. If such a movement had succeeded in bringing about reforms, so that the slaves were better cared for and worked only in accordance with their strength; if corporal punishment had been controlled, if hours of labor had been regulated, and the custom of separating families and selling them down the river stopped, the abolition movement would have suffered a serious setback. In fact "Uncle Tom's Cabin" would probably never have been written, and the effect of Lincoln's debates with Douglas would have proved comparatively small. With public discussion diverted from the fundamental injustice of slavery, which was slavery itself, to a humanitarian, safety-first reform movement, intended to improve but not abolish slavery, wild radicals, who still favored abolition, would have found themselves pocketed, and "the peculiar institution" would certainly have had a new lease of life.

THE NEW REPUBLIC is a humanitarian paper. It is eloquent upon the subject of present conditions. But it concentrates attention on symptoms and incidentals, and maintains silence in regard to the foundations upon which the whole fabric of social injustice rests. And this, after all, is only dragging the old red herring across the trail, and luring those really interested in progress away from the consideration of constructive remedial action.

It is a discouraging thing (but perhaps a natural one, when we remember the influence of such cultivated but on the whole anti-social minds as those of men like ex-President Eliot, President Hadley and President Butler, who largely control the thought of our Eastern universities) that many of our most brilliant college graduates do not intellectually "follow through." In spite of a highly developed critical sense, they seem to have no taste for social analysis that reaches beyond clever academic controversy, or below the surface outcroppings of underlying conditions. It seems as if, at the moment when these men arrive at a place where they are about to lean down and grasp the thing that is causal and underneath, an almost physical presence approaches from behind, drags them back, and shoves them along some less vital and more tranquil path of thought.

Whether this drawing-back, this attitude that rarely goes beyond the tentative, is due to a feeling that good taste does not permit them to descend into the more turgid currents of life, or whether it is caused by the belief that it is useless to struggle against the established, except gracefully and in a calisthenic kind of way, it is hard to say. Perhaps it arises from the existence of a sub-conscious class feeling that warns them against disturbing the institutional privileges upon which the security of their class depends. But whatever the cause, the effect is plain. Always a regression takes place before the end of the trail is reached.

And so it is with THE NEW REPUBLIC. It speaks of injustice eloquently, critically; of economic exploitation, of child labor, of unemployment and of the cost of living. But it treats all as though they were causeless, spontaneous phenomena without genealogy—irreducible and not-to-be analyzed entities of this nation's glorious progress toward the millennium. If the editors of THE NEW REPUBLIC had been called upon to write the book of Genesis, I believe that the story of the creation would have begun with the sixth day when God saw everything he had made, and, behold, it was very good—except the Sherman law and the Democratic administration.

Of course, if we see in child labor only the picture of puny children toiling at the breaker or the loom, and do not see the long struggle against want that culminates on the day the child is first led to the mine or factory gate, a reference to the more obvious side of child labor is enough—perhaps too much. Again, if we accept at its face value the statement of the monopolist, to the effect that government regulation is the answer to the monopoly question and that trusts are only beneficial combinations formed in order to effect efficiency and economy, it is unnecessary to go deeper.

But when the question is reached, why the trusts were formed, or what is their actual effect on industry, on prices and on labor, or whether real regulation in the public's interest is possible, THE NEW REPUBLIC instinctively draws back. The discussion becomes purely tentative; and we suddenly realize we are reading about trade in China or the sins of Mr. Bryan in the State Department.

So, too, with the government ownership of railroads. Beyond an occasional allusion to a distant by-and-by that may bring government ownership within the pale of serious consideration, we find THE NEW REPUBLIC's interest in this subject to be of the most illusory and academic description. And this is true of municipal ownership, of the land-tax question, and of every one of those vital and troublesome problems where economic privilege and democracy are lining up for a real and not a sham fight.

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The test of a liberal magazine is not whether it attacks or ignores the abuses that are incidental to privilege. The test is whether it stands for or against privilege. And it gives one a dreary feeling to see THE NEW REPUBLIC, this newborn champion of progressive aspirations, courting no greater adventure than the maintenance of neutrality on dangerous ground.

But how is this consistent with the occasional appearance of socialistic doctrine in the columns of THE NEW REPUBLIC?

Well, even Wall Street has become strangely tolerant of socialism. In fact, I am not at all sure that if Mr. Hilquit wanted to have a socialist parade, Wall Street would not furnish the band. But this attitude is not by way of recognizing socialism's undoubted advance. It is because the powers that be believe that the propaganda of socialism is more remote and less dangerous than the radical thought that is now springing up everywhere outside of party lines. This thought is to-day concentrating on government ownership of railroads and municipal ownership of public utilities. And so the more Mr. Hilquit talks about the abolition of capitalism and the federalization of all industry, the better Wall Street likes it; for to them such propaganda seems merely a swamp-fire to lead the faithful off into the night. Or it is as if Mr. Hilquit were to meet Mr. Rockefeller or Mr. Gary and say, "Look here, I do not approve of your economics. Therefore when we meet in heaven I will take the first opportunity to punch your head." On the whole, the threat seems to contain a certain comfortable postponement of realization. But if, on the other hand, the socialists were to band with all who are fighting for government ownership of railroads and municipal ownership of public utilities, and limit their propaganda to such ominous and immediate issues, the magazines would close their pages to socialism with a loud bang and the newspapers would shudder at the mere mention of its name.

I do not accuse THE NEW REPUBLIC of the slightest intention to censor its pages. The censorship to which I refer is strictly subconscious and automatic. But what I do say is, that if it is to stand for common welfare as against concentrated wealth, and progress as against inertia, it must adopt a larger policy and encourage discussion of all things that are fundamental in American life. In fact it was the belief that THE NEW REPUBLIC would perform this sadly neglected function of journalism which caused its appearance to be hailed with so much joy. Indeed we cannot help being worried by the thought of how much more satisfaction the editors might have if they played a little bolder hand or sailed more wickedly upon a wilder sea.

"Erudition," says Walt Whitman, "is low among the virtues of humanity." And the same may be said of a too highly critical and cultivated taste. Still we need not be roughnecks or mule-skinners in order to realize the occasional virtue of departure from the more classic conceptions of life. There is a saving grace in being able, not prone, to employ execrably bad taste now and then, not only in the selection of our ideas, but in the choice of our cigars, our friends, and conceptions of God. For how, except through the rude breaking-down of taboos and the harsh realization that the bad proves often the good and the good somehow the bad, does society move onward toward the millennium over the hill?

Although it is true that THE NEW REPUBLIC has been flirting more or less openly with radicalism, I for my part would like to see the affair take on a warmer hue. Even if the return home to sleep in the virtuous couch now and then became a subject of scandalized doubt, we would be inclined to forgive THE NEW REPUBLIC on the score of youth. But to be chargeable with an impregnable virtue, already cast in the mould of respectable middle age, seems a hard fate for a magazine just starting on life's journey. When, in this short span of days, will the "mighty, young bronze beasts" have their youth?

But is not a man, or a magazine, or its editors, entitled to peace and quiet and a little dignified yet not necessarily cloistered ease? Must there forever be continual war and struggle? Yes, as long as most of the world lives in suffering and poverty, and until a day has dawned when a deeper spirit of fraternity shall bring some measure of justice to all who are born. Of course I suppose that if a man wants peace and quiet, and can find it without injustice to others or to himself, he is entitled to it. But why—when life is so short and the strength to play the game, as each sees it, so fleeting—why in heaven's name does he want it?

AMOS PINCHOT.

New York City, May 6, 1915.

[To Mr. Pinchot's misinformation about THE NEW REPUBLIC there is no need to make reply. Those who have read the paper more carefully than he has will know that on many specific points he has misrepresented the position of THE NEW REPUBLIC. To more casual readers citations of chapter and verse would be a bore. The main argument of his letter, after all, is that the journal does not "follow through," and that it does not follow through because of a subconscious class feeling which rises to the defense of privilege.

It is difficult to discuss one's own subconscious, or to know its limitations. But Mr. Pinchot is evidently a really free mind, and by studying him we are a little better able to discover what it is to have an intellect which "follows through" to "the thing itself." Thus Mr. Pinchot is opposed to economic exploitation; he is for a radical remedy which shall end it and establish social justice. But when he himself starts to "follow through" he betrays the fact that he sees misery as a single problem. It is the characteristic vice of all beginners in social service. He has thought so little about the problem that he imagines modern wage-slavery to be like chattel slavery, an evil which has one legal root to be severed. It is that one solution which he accuses us of avoiding, that one deeply radical social act which is destined to free mankind.

But what is that "thing itself" which we evade and Mr. Pinchot embraces? It is "government ownership of railroads and municipal ownership of public utilities." This to him is the test of whether a man "stands for or against privilege." In view of the fact that Prussia met this test a generation ago, we are really unable to take Mr. Pinchot's radicalism very seriously. If government ownership is to be the test of "following through," then the Czar Nicholas, Bismarck, Lord Kitchener and some of our own conservative railroad presidents are the real campaigners against

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economic exploitation. Has Mr. Pinchot read absolutely nothing? Is he unaware of the European landslide into collectivism? Has he never heard of the fact that the more alert radical thought of Europe and America is profoundly distrustful of this vast extension of government, unless accompanied by an equally vast increase of democratic control? How then in the face of it can he imagine that he has "followed through" the social problem, because he wishes to fight for public ownership?

Has he ever asked himself what are to be the relations of labor to these government enterprises? Are strikes to be permitted? Are strikes likely to be permitted? Would he advise labor to surrender the right to strike in case the government ran the railroads? How would he fix railroad rates and railroad wages? Would he pay the present owners of the railroads the face value of the capitalization? Does he wish government ownership next winter or ten years from now? Would he prefer to buy the railroads now, or would he prefer to wait until regulation had gone further—and when he had got the railroads into the government's hands, and United States bonds into the safes of the investors, how much nearer would he be to the ending of economic exploitation?

These are pertinent questions to anyone honestly trying to "follow through." Similar ones will have to be asked about land taxation and conservation, the handling of unemployment, the ending of child labor, and the thousand other questions which make up the reality behind that simple phrase about privilege and democracy. When, for example, working men in Pennsylvania vote for a tariff which will raise prices for other workingmen, where is privilege and where is democracy? When the railroad unions oppose government ownership and many railroad presidents favor it, where is the simple line-up which Mr. Pinchot has in mind?

Mr. Pinchot must forgive us if we cannot imitate his simplicity. We are puzzled about these complex issues; we don't pretend to know the answers to very many of them, and we have tried at all times to avoid the delusion which finds the answer easy because the problem itself has never been thoroughly understood.

And yet we do not mean to imply for one moment the least complacency about THE NEW REPUBLIC. In these seven months we have failed again and again, have blundered because of ignorance and of natural limitations. Perhaps time and experience will remedy some of these defects. For only better understanding can really help in the difficult business of doing something more with radicalism than state its vaguest aspirations. Mr. Pinchot with fine feeling is devoted to the task of saying with no precision at all what he would like to see come to pass. The labor of finding means to his end, the task of appraising methods, are drudgeries which he has been able to spare himself.—THE EDITORS.]

CORRESPONDENCE

To Nationalize Arms-Making

SIR: There are more important lessons to be learned from the tragedy of the great war than that of military preparedness, to which our attention is constantly and urgently directed. Legislation must in the future concern itself with a more soundly reasoned and radical program.

Two major considerations, with which our legislators shall have to deal, loom from the surrounding wreck of civilization. The first is the question of continuing the race for national armament, on the value of which we have recently had illuminating revelation, and the second, the question of contraband. The futility of all schemes for the reduction of armament has long been discouragingly apparent. One hope is the suggestion to nationalize the manufacture of the sinews of war. Such a policy, if adopted, would remove production of arms, armament, and ammunition from the realm of individual greed, which has so long been a menace to international tranquillity. It would be the first step toward the goal of ultimate disarmament in that it would place direct and complete control of the industry in the hands of the people's representatives, to be used for the people's welfare, and to be abandoned when it shall have become the part of wisdom, without loss to individuals.

The problem of contraband would be largely solved by the nationalization of the manufacture of arms and ammunition. The nation is never a vendor for profit. It would consequently not sell these things to foreign belligerents, and the question of the sale of them, now waged so bitterly, would be promptly and permanently answered. Arms and ammunition, it is to be remembered, constitute the major percentage of what is known as absolute contraband. The suggestion, already made in print, that Congress prohibit the shipment of contraband on passenger-carrying vessels is excellent. Why not go one step farther and prohibit entirely the exportation of absolute contraband to foreign belligerents during the period of hostilities? The temporary loss in trade to us would be more than compensated by the saving in confiscated cargoes, in human lives, and in international complications. Such legislation would be, on our part, a withering condemnation of war. It would minimize the advantages to a belligerent of a superior fleet, and so make for the freedom of the sea and for emancipation from the insane race for naval armament. It would, in many cases, make a resort to war impossible. And finally, it would completely remove the possibility of such an incident as the torpedoing of the Gulflight, and make forever impossible the unblushing defense, on grounds of the presence of contraband, of such an heinous crime as the sinking of the Lusitania.

BRENT D. ALLINSON.

Chicago, Ill.

Friendly Correction

SIR: In your issue of May eighth I note the statement that in testifying before the Industrial Commission Mr. Lincoln stated that the dividends of the Pullman Company last year were $161,000,000. The evident purpose of this statement was to emphasize in the public mind the amount of the company's earnings. If this is so it is quite misleading.

The dividends paid last year, as shown by the statement issued by the company, were $9,599,564, and not $161,000,000. Mr. Lincoln stated in his testimony that

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the total amount of dividends paid since 1867, a period of forty-eight years, was $161,000,000; not that the payments for last year were that amount.

No doubt the inaccuracy of your statement was inadvertent, but on account of the confidence your readers have in the accuracy of your facts as well as the correctness of your opinions, I have thought you might desire to correct an error so obvious, and, in controversy, so important.

FRANCIS W. LANE.

Chicago, Ill.

Pink Thought and Yellow

SIR: Mr. Chesterton meant to say, says one of his defenders, that it was just as absurd for thought to be called modern as for it to be called pink. And this seems to the defender so indisputably absurd that the controversy is settled. It is a habit of the modernist reactionary to consider a controversy settled at the point where it has actually begun. For my part, I take great pleasure in the suggestion, pink thoughts: they are the kind, I have no doubt, that you hear expressed at pink teas—suffused with the tepidly illusive color of life. And this taste is not especially queer: to speak of the blue thoughts of the disappointed lover, of the white thoughts of his beloved, or of the black thoughts of the villain (who is naturally present) does not violate the most delicate rhetorician's sense of decency. There is no reason, indeed, why other hues of the spectrum should not be used more adequately to describe our varying shades and colors of thought. When reading *The New Witness* I am oppressed by a painful, lurid feeling of yellow, which the Chestertons would proclaim as the rising fires of Dawn, but which seem to me more like the dying fires of Hell.

LEWIS C. MUMFORD.

New York City.

The Zionist Ideal

SIR: Your reviewer of Israel Cohen's "Jewish Life in Modern Times" fears that the sad picture of the disintegration of Judaism as portrayed in that book is somewhat overdrawn. As a subordinate of the Actions Committee of the international Zionist movement Mr. Cohen was, up to the outbreak of the war, in a position to keep in close touch with all sorts and conditions of Jews the world over, while his orderly and skilful handling of various statistics in the book itself proves his competency for the rather arduous task he had set before himself. There may be an emphasized predilection for the Zionist ideal as the only cohesive force in modern Jewry—that is natural from a man who has been an active propagandist himself.

The power of racial affiliation and loyalty as a centripetal force in distinction to the very disrupting power of agnosticism in matters religious, had no better instance than the case of an American poet of a past generation, Emma Lazarus. In her early years she had written on themes very remote from actual life: love, beauty, mediaeval legends and the like. Her soul went through its baptism of fire when the Jews of Russia began to flock to America in the early 'eighties, goaded on by the infamous May Laws of that time. "The Songs of a Semite" published a few years later presented her outraged feelings to the world—the "Banner of the Jew" was her rallying cry to all Jewry, whereas "The Dance to Death," reminding one of Marlowe's "Jew of Malta" in its horror, symbolized the eternal hatred meted out to an eternal race.

And yet, when this new champion of her oppressed people was on her death-bed, at a time when many agnostics and atheists unhesitatingly seek the little comfort they can from religious ministration, she sought the help and guidance of one who had seceded from her own religious fold and had set up a new faith—Dr. Felix Adler, the leader of the Ethical Culture movement in America.

In this notable instance the firm belief in the old religious practices had been completely surrendered, but the racial ties were tenaciously held to with "hoops of steel."

HERMAN B. TANNER.

New York City.

Reply to a Review

SIR: Mr. Bourne's criticism in your Spring Literary Review of my book "Problems of Community Life" seems to me to exhibit a fault that is characteristic of many reviewers. The sole intent of the book is to analyze the issues with which, in industrial communities, economic classes, "wills to power" and "publics" (whose existence Mr. Bourne denies) concern or should concern themselves. He does not attempt to show whether this analysis is well done, but attacks it for not being something entirely different—for not showing, for instance, "just what dynamic force is to be relied upon to carry through this exhaustive program of reconstruction." He even goes so far as to hint that because the political or economic class-struggle is not stressed throughout, the author must therefore be unaware that any such struggle is going on! He quarrels particularly with the assumption of a "public" or of a public point of view, which is the one pertinent criticism in the review. It should suffice to point out, in reply to that, that roughly one-half of the community problems the people are called upon to deal with are questions wherein conflicting class interests do not enter at all, or, if they do, play only a minor part; and that the community has an interest in those questions that are dominated by class interests.

For the rest, the method followed by Mr. Bourne is an easy but an indolent one. It is to find out what the book is not nor purports to be, and then to attack it for not being that, with the result that people are misled as to the merits of that something which it really is.

SEBA ELDRIDGE.

New York City.

Defending Ellen Key

SIR: I cannot understand how Miss Rebecca West's article on Ellen Key was found acceptable, unless perhaps Mr. Hackett was too busy to read it. Certainly if he had, one feels that Miss West would never have had the temerity or the inclination to publish it and thereby expose such intellectual and spiritual limitations. Although each point in the indictment formulated by Miss West can be convincingly replied to, one only needs to call attention to the spirit of the article to realize the limitations of its author as a critic of Ellen Key. In reading it one felt that Miss West was writing in a mood of irritation perhaps caused by her inability to comprehend or to sympathize with the thoughts of Ellen Key. One hopes that Miss West will not have to live very long to regret not only the spirit of her article but the substance of her attack on Ellen Key—who is not only one of the ablest but also one of the noblest of living women.

ROBERT ANDERSON POPE.

New York City.

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Books and Things

AN old friend, so old that most of the persons he loved best are dead, said to me the other day: "One of my tests for people is what they write or say when somebody I care about has died. Perhaps I've been unlucky, though I don't think I have, but I'm always surprised, just as if I've never noticed it before, to see how few of my friends acquit themselves even decently at such times. So many worthy and kindly persons are formal and stiff and apparently numb. So many sincere persons sound insincere and rhetorical. So few write and speak with simplicity and feeling. I value these last, let me tell you. There's one man, very hard up he is, who wrote me such a letter when Dick was killed that I've left him quite a bit of money, and all because of that letter."

Before long we shall once more be showing as a nation the same incapacity which this old man noticed in his friends. Every Memorial Day bids us remember a cause for which so many deaths were not too high a price. Every Memorial Day brings us into the presence of death, if we care to be brought there. And on every Memorial Day the speeches and addresses, with few exceptions, are poor in thought, poor in feeling, poor in words, rich in nothing but good intentions. We may sit still and regret this incapacity, if we choose, or resent it. But a better use of the day is to recall some of the finest sayings to which our Civil War has inspired a few Americans. "There is something highly paradoxical," says William James, "in the modern man's relation to war. Ask all our millions, north and south, whether they would vote now (were such a thing possible) to have our war for the Union expunged from history, and the record of a peaceful transition to the present time substituted for that of its marches and battles, and probably hardly a handful of eccentrics would say yes. Those ancestors, those efforts, those memories and legends, are the most ideal part of what we now own together, a sacred spiritual possession worth more than all the blood poured out. Yet ask those same people whether they would be willing in cold blood to start another civil war now to gain another similar possession, and not one man or woman would vote for the proposition. In modern eyes, precious though wars may be, they must not be waged solely for the sake of the ideal harvest." These words force even one of the "handful of eccentrics" to consider war more curiously than before.

Among Memorial Day addresses the one I like best, and expect to like best always, is more than thirty years old. It was made at Keene, New Hampshire, in 1884. In answer to "the indifferent inquirer who asks why Memorial Day is still kept up" the speaker said: "It embodies in the most impressive form our belief that to act with enthusiasm and faith is the condition of acting greatly. To fight out a war you must believe something and want something with all your might . . . When it was felt so deeply as it was on both sides that a man ought to take part in the war unless some conscientious scruple or strong practical reason made it impossible, was that feeling simply the requirement of a local majority that their neighbors should agree with them? I think not: I think the feeling was right—in the South as in the North. I think that, as life is action and passion, it is required of a man that he should share the passion and action of his time at peril of being judged not to have lived." Later in the same address the speaker said: "Feeling begets feeling, and great feeling begets great feeling. We can hardly share the emotions which make this day to us the most sacred day of the year, and embody them in ceremonial pomp, without in some degree imparting them to those who come after us."

People who take an interest in American letters, and whose interest heats them to the reading-point, have already recognized this speaker as Mr. Justice Holmes, of whom the whole address is characteristic. Take, for example, the passage in which he remembers a young comrade killed in the Wilderness: "I observed him in every kind of duty, and never in all the time that I knew him did I see him fail to choose that alternative of conduct which was most disagreeable to himself. He was indeed a Puritan in all his virtues, without the Puritan austerity . . ." Of Mr. Justice Holmes himself, who writes, in the *Illinois Law Review* for this May, that "to have doubted one's own first principles is the mark of a civilized man," one might say that he is a Puritan whom doubt has civilized without weakening his Puritan strength. You do not resent the Puritan virtues when he praises them. He tempts you to be tolerant, for the moment, of those men and women who always choose that alternative of conduct which is most disagreeable to themselves; tempts you to forget how often this choice is petrified into a rule; how they undervalue, as a guide to conduct, insight into the details of special cases; how often they make the disagreeableness of conduct both the sole test of its worth and also an excuse for shirking the labor of thought.

He must indeed be a civilized and persuasive Puritan who can make one forget all this. Not until later, when I have got out from under his influence, do I remember certain egotists of my acquaintance, persons who always thought they chose the disagreeable, who looked upon the universe as a fire which existed to temper and purify their characters, and who ended by not caring how many other people's characters were used as fuel. But Mr. Justice Holmes's persuasiveness has its effect as often as I expose myself to it. "As I wrote many years ago"—so he says in the *Illinois Law Review* article, alive with curious thought—"the mode in which the inevitable comes to pass is through effort." Unless you can taste the antique virtue of that saying you would do well to consider whether you are not paying a good deal for your conviction that the worth of effort, like the moral worth of disagreeableness, has been overrated. Such a saying may set you to thinking out that critique of effort which so few of us do think out. In my own case the time for such thinking has passed, I know. My mind wanders from admiration of Mr. Justice Holmes's saying to pleasure in something I once heard in talk: "After all, effort isn't the only test everywhere. The good digestion is the digestion that digests easily, not the one that tries hard."

What is the secret of Mr. Justice Holmes's persuasiveness? Perhaps it is the reality of his faiths and admirations, of his loyalties and of his critical thought. Few Americans capable of sending their minds on such long voyages have used their minds so continuously on concrete difficult tasks. He has made his mind, in those hours when he could do what he would with it, a field of battle between ideals and doubts, and the understanding of the other gained by each combatant has tempered his wisdom, the result of that conflict.

P. L.

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Our Neighbors' Ways

South of Panama, by Edward Alsworth Ross, Ph.D., LL.D. New York: The Century Co. $2.00 net.

THIS entertaining volume does not make a complete survey of South America. Professor Ross went down the west coast, taking in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. He then traversed Chile and Argentina. His return journey carried him up the east coast, but probably he had not the time at his disposal to cover Brazil. At any rate, the B is left out of Professor Ross's ABC, and in addition there is no word of Uruguay, Paraguay, Guiana or Venezuela.

For what it is, however, and so far as it goes, this is a capital piece of work. It does not pretend to be an authoritative contribution to sociology. It is the work of a sociologist on vacation, and its aim, first of all, is to give the person who knows practically nothing about South America a lively impression of each country's idiosyncrasy, and then to interpret in terms of our own social ideology each country's character and institutions. It is, in short, a very skilful bird's-eye view of the body and spirit of South America. It differs from the ordinary book of travel in many particulars. It eliminates almost entirely the private personal experience. But because Professor Ross is a man of ardent temperament, of strong convictions and energetic preferences, he manages to get each country into sociological perspective in a vigorous and dramatic manner. Even when he embarks in the second half on the morals, character, education, religion, politics, government, class and sex morality of South America, taking in cross-sections the countries he had previously taken as they came, he succeeds in generalizing with a maximum of effectiveness. That this effectiveness is often journalistic is true, but even when the offering is glorified gossip it is a kind of gossip which helps decidedly in making South America intelligible.

In his travel narrative Professor Ross is best and safest. He has an eye for the significant and picturesque, and a few pages enable him to give striking character to countries like Ecuador and Colombia. To convey that the merchants of Guayaquil are short-sighted he reports them as tolerating yellow fever and bubonic plague, lest sanitation bring in the gringo to wrest away business. To convey that the Indian of Ecuador resembles closely a passive beast of burden, he defines the dull gaze of the Indian woman, so different from the sidelong, challenging glance of the lowland negress, and he describes "a file of barefoot women bent under loads of earth or bricks, escorted by a man with a whip!" He sees Cali, the hill town in Colombia, as "a pretty girl—considerably tanned—seated on a bank and paddling her feet in a brook." He does not tritely state that Ecuador could feed fifty millions instead of less than two. He speaks of the ports as "spigots spouting natural products from an inexhaustible back country."

Peru attracted Professor Ross more than any other country. "Were I to be exiled, and confined for the rest of my life to one country, I should choose Peru. Here is every altitude, every climate, every scene. Coastal Peru is an Egypt, central Peru a Tibet, eastern Peru a Congo country. The lifeless desert and the teeming jungle, the hottest lowlands and the bleakest highlands, heaven-piercing peaks and rivers raving through cañons—all are of Peru. Here one meets with the highest tillage, the highest mines, the highest steamboat navigation. The crassest heathenism flourishes two days in the saddle from noble cathedrals, and the bustling ports are counterpoised by secluded inland towns where the Past lies miraculously preserved like the mummy of the saint in a crypt. In the year 2000, when the Tyrol and the Abruzzi, Dalmatia and Carinthia, have lost their Old-World character, travelers may be seeking the towns hidden away in the Andes—Cajamarca, Huancavelica, Andahuaylas, and Ayacucho—for rare bits of lustrous medieval life untarnished by the breath of modernism."

This is stimulating, and a great deal of the book has the same bright and breezy air. The brightness and breeziness can, however, have a different effect—as when marvelous Cuzco is mentioned: "A Cook who should organize a good tourist service, make known the wonders of the region, and turn in this direction a stream of appreciative travelers, would make his fortune, while at the same time giving encouragement to American archaeology." Why help Cook to invade another innocent land? But Professor Ross has blind spots.

When he comes to give his estimate of the various republics Professor Ross is resolutely candid. "My first obligation," he says in his preface, "is not to National Policy but to Truth." In view of the traditional desire of "publicists" to propitiate South America, this bluntness is decidedly valuable. The first essential that he notes in his general estimate is the "momentous basic fact" that "from the Rio Grande down the West Coast to Cape Horn, free agricultural labor as we know it does not exist. In general, the laborers on the estates are at various stages of mitigation of the once universal slavery into which the native populations were crushed by the iron heel of the conquistador." And he adds: "Broadly speaking, light and freedom wax as you go south from Panama. Ecuador is less medieval than Colombia, Peru than Ecuador, Chile than Peru."

"The masterful whites," he puts it in his preface, "simply climbed upon the backs of the natives and exploited them. Thus pride, contempt for labor, caste, social parasitism, and authoritativeness in Church and State fastened upon South American society and characterize it still. It will be yet long ere it is transformed by such modern forces as Industry, Democracy and Science."

In Argentina, however, the spirit is different. "The forces contending for the soul of the Argentine people are the same that we know so well—democracy and plutocracy." He expands: "Its policy of lay education, its democratic school system, its education of girls, its normal schools, its reliance upon the woman elementary teacher, its cultivation of athletic sports, its boy scouts, its public libraries, its bacteriological laboratories, its experiment stations, its boards of health, its National Department of Agriculture, which spends half as much as the United States Department of Agriculture—all these innovations witness to the willingness of Argentina to risk change of soul." And he concludes: "The Argentines are the one South American people likely to have enough in common with us to found a genuine friendship on."

The large Germanic element in Chile is admired by Professor Ross, but the native Chileans are deprecated. They "have the pride of the Spaniard and the laziness of the Araucanian." It is in Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia, however, that the young man "won't stick to anything difficult;" and the Colombians—the Americans look on them as children. At times Professor Ross seems far too prone, stupidly prone, to accept such estimates, and to believe that many despicable traits are inherent in South Americans, but he finally concludes that "the environment school is nearer right. Heredity is a cheap offhand explanation."

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He even urges that climate, race and history should be considered in judging the bugbear Catholic Church.

"South of Panama" is essentially a book of popularized knowledge and interpretation. But as such it gives one an admirable introduction to South America. It has eighty photographs. F. H.

Ibsen's Brand vs. Shaw's

Brand, a Dramatic Poem, by Henrik Ibsen, translated by F. E. Garrett. Everyman's Library. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company. Cloth, 35 cents; Library Edition, 50 cents; Leather, 75 cents.

BEFORE re-reading "Brand," of which the late Edmund Garrett's colored and energetic verse translation has just been republished in Everyman's Library, I did my best to remember the poem. I could not remember it. Just as one's memory of some steep valley visited years ago is often effaced by a memory of colorless photographs of the valley seen more recently, so Bernard Shaw's exposition in "The Quintessence of Ibsenism" had substituted itself for my memory of Ibsen's "Brand."

Mr. Shaw's exposition of the Ibsenism in "Brand" is one of the most original parts of one of his most original books. In the summer of 1890 circumstances forced him "to make up his mind definitely as to what Ibsen's plays meant." From the first or 1891 edition of the "Quintessence" we learn that in a typical Ibsen play the "villain" is an idealist, that "Brand the priest is an idealist of heroic earnestness, strength and courage," that "Brand, aspiring from height to height of devotion to his ideal, plunges from depth to depth of murderous cruelty," that "Brand dies a saint, having caused more intense suffering by his saintliness than the most talented sinner could possibly have done with twice his opportunities." "Brand" was published in 1866, "Peer Gynt" in 1867. "Had Ibsen died in 1867," says Mr. Shaw, "he, like many another great poet, would have gone to his grave without having ever rationally understood his own meaning. Nay, if in that year an intellectual expert—a commentator, as we call him— had gone to Ibsen and offered him the explanation of 'Brand' which he must have arrived at before he constructed 'Ghosts' and 'The Wild Duck,' he would perhaps have repudiated it with as much disgust as a maiden would feel if any one were brutal enough to give her the physiological *rationale* of her dreams of meeting a fairy prince."

Thus it is evident that Mr. Shaw's exposition of "Brand" is deliberately unlike any exposition which Ibsen might conceivably have offered during or soon after the composition of the poem. Mr. Shaw purposely left out a great deal. How much he left out is apparent to anybody who takes this opportunity of reading "Brand" in Garrett's translation. He has left out everything which differentiates an Ibsen poem written in 1865 from an Ibsen prose play written in 1884. What he says about the results of Brand's conduct is literally accurate. But the poem consists not only of Brand's conduct but of Ibsen's attitude toward Brand.

The impression left by the poem on most readers is nowhere near so clear and simple as the impression it left on Mr. Shaw. Had Ibsen treated the same subject twenty years later he would very likely have treated it in prose and ironically. In the poem as it stands there is plenty of irony, but most of this irony is found in the presentation of minor characters, notably the Sheriff and the Dean, who exist to emphasize not the ruin achieved by Brand's ferocious idealism but the high ice-gorge beauty of that ferocity. To Ibsen in 1865 Brand was a picture of strength. To Mr. Shaw in 1891 and also in 1913, when an enlarged edition of the "Quintessence" was published, Brand is a picture of ruin. To most of us he is a picture of strength among the ruins, painted by a poet who did not see the ugliness of ruin and who did see the beauty of strength. The poem is an exaltation of will and of Brand's pitiless devotion to his "all or nothing" faith. While reading I feel not only the hideousness of Brand's conduct as estimated by its effects, but also the courage which kept him so long on the wing. As I read I feel that courage is a good-in-itself, that to estimate such a blue-steel will as Brand's solely by its results in happiness or unhappiness is to leave out too much. In such a will as Brand's there is something which makes attempts to value it in terms of happiness everlastingly irrelevant. The ruinous flawless will may have a beauty of its own—a beauty of energy, a beauty of relentlessness. Even its blindness may have beauty.

Bernard Shaw's exposition—written when he was thirty-five—of Brand—written when Ibsen was thirty-seven—is a judgment passed by age upon youth, a judgment which a man of prose, with a blue-print of life in his hands, passes upon a poet who is living.

Now, especially, when the war has opened many of our closed windows, do we see in "Brand" those things which Mr. Shaw has done his lucid and emphatic utmost to keep us from seeing. "Brand" is best understood in wartime because it was written when Ibsen was possessed and tortured and haunted by Norway's failure to help Denmark

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resist the Prussian attack. That national remorse which his country did not feel was felt with intensity by Ibsen. The idealism in whose name Brand ruined so many lives was in 1865 Ibsen's own. He said himself that in "Brand" a Norwegian ideal figure sat in judgment upon Norwegian sloth. "I know," he wrote from Rome in December, 1865, soon after he had finished the poem, "of mothers away up in Piedmont, women of Genoa, Novara, Alessandria, who took their boys of fourteen from school to send them with Garibaldi on his daring expedition to Palermo; and remember, it was not a case of saving their country then but of realising an idea." In March, 1866, his state of mind had not altered: "What has occurred in the last two or three years in our country—or rather what has not occurred—sufficiently demonstrates the fact that there is no more connection between the Norwegians of to-day and those of the great days of old than there is between the Greek pirates of modern times and those ancients who had courage and faith and strength of will, and therefore the gods also, on their side." And in March, 1870: "The demand 'all or nothing' is made in all relations of life—in love, in art, etc. Brand is myself in my best moments."

In the 1913 edition of the "Quintessence" Mr. Shaw says it is in "Brand" that Ibsen "definitely, if not yet quite consciously, takes the field against idealism and, like another Luther, nails his thesis to the door of the Temple of Morality." Four and a half years after finishing "Brand" we find Ibsen regarding it as the opposite of an attack upon idealism. So far as I know there is no evidence that he ever became "quite conscious" that in 1865 he had attacked idealism without knowing what he was about. "Brand" is as damaging to idealism, in Mr. Shaw's sense of the word, as he says it is; but the damage is done in spite of the passionate convictions that were Ibsen's when he wrote it. Imagine "The Wild Duck" written in verse that echoed the noise of avalanches falling fjordwards. Imagine the harm done by Gregers Werle recorded by a poet who regarded Gregers as "myself in my best moments," as a man of courage and crystal will. The impression such a poem would make would be no stranger, no more contradictory, than the impression left by "Brand."

P. L.

Reservations to "Twilight Sleep"

Painless Childbirth, by Margaret Tracy and Mary Boyd. New York: F. A. Stokes Company. $1.50 net.

THE condition called "twilight sleep" is produced by the hypodermic injection of two drugs, morphine and scopolamin, a member of the belladonna group. In "Painless Childbirth" Margaret Tracy and Mary Boyd describe the method of administering these drugs, the procedure and the results. They have hurt their book by seeming to imply that labor pains are responsible for all the complications which occur in pregnancy, labor and subsequent convalescence. They have hurt their book by writing here and there as if they believed that reluctance to accept without further examination all the claims made for "twilight sleep" is always due to callousness in the sceptical obstetrician. To physicians who report fatalities or other bad results their answer is always the same—faulty technique.

The most eminent obstetricians in the United States have not yet given their approval to "twilight sleep." This fact may be explained, by those who like such easy explanations, by calling these men routine and callous opponents of change. It may also be explained by summarizing the results of the new method as observed thus far in this country.

"Twilight sleep" is in many instances successful. It is not the peaceful dream-state that the authors of this book would have us believe. It increases the risk to the mother. The increase in risk to the child is slightly greater. In about seventy per cent of the cases selected it has been successful. Some women have such a peculiar susceptibility to the two drugs that their use is unsafe. Other women are so refractory to their action that the desired state is not brought about by even the largest therapeutic doses.

Injections are not given until the labor pains are well established. Gauss, one of the most successful believers in "twilight sleep," does not inject until the pains endure from one-half to one minute and are coming at regular intervals of four or five minutes. Part of the labor, in other words, is felt. It is also remembered. Then there follows not an ideal dream-state but a state of intoxication by belladonna. The patient, with flushed face and dilated pupils, twitches the bedclothes, begs for water, asks the doctor for relief from pain. There is marked unrest and occasionally delirium. In this state, when the method is successful, the child is born without the mother's remembering the delivery.

Many of the babies are born in a condition of oligopnoea, which means suspended respiration. In most instances they recover, with or without the doctor's help in producing respiration. In a few cases they are born deeply asphyxtic and do not breathe again.

The method is applicable to many women but not to all. Before a physician applies it he should explain the risks to the patient and her husband. The best conditions are obtained with difficulty except in the best-appointed hospitals. To attempt the treatment at home is dangerous unless one can have all the trained assistants necessary. Sometimes three or four are required. The authors of this book are right in urging women to consult not the general practitioner but the trained specialist, and to go to the best hospital they can find.

Their book puts as forcibly as they know how the advantages of the scopolamin semi-narcosis. It rather minimizes the difficulties and disadvantages.

M. D.

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